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This dissertation examines local government policy-making on policies that concern Muslim 
immigrants and their descendants in Western Europe.  Governments across the region struggle to 
integrate these populations economically, socially, and politically, even though large-scale 
Muslim immigration began after World War Two.  We would expect center-left political parties 
to promote Muslim interests and drive integration efforts because these parties are socially 
liberal, and have historically represented minorities and individuals with low socioeconomic 
status.  Contrary to these expectations, I show that there is great variability in center-left policies 
towards Muslims and minorities more generally.  Using a unique dataset of more than 750 
policies that I constructed using meeting records from district governments in Berlin, Germany, I 
demonstrate that center-left parties set the agenda on the incorporation of Muslims in some 
locations, but are largely absent from integration policy-making in other parts of the city.  This 
finding contrasts the dominant notion in the immigration literature that European center-left 
parties consistently advocate for Muslims and minorities.  It is difficult to predict where center-
left parties will be active on immigrant policy issues because party behavior differs in 
demographically and institutionally similar districts.  Center-left policy-making even varies in 
districts with comparably sizable immigrant populations.  Inconsistencies in party behavior 
generate the central question I explore in my dissertation:  Why do the same center-left parties 
endorse immigrant interests in some locations and not in others?   To explain deviations in 
center-left behavior, I first turn to sociological and institutional theories of party behavior.  
However, my data show that neither demographics nor institutions account for this variance.  
Center-left politicians are not more active on integration in districts with large numbers of 
immigrants or where their party controls government.  Given that these factors cannot explain 
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party behavior on integration, I offer an alternative approach that emphasizes local-level political 
party competition.  I argue that strategic electoral concerns affect center-left policy-making, and 
that these interests supersede demographics, institutions, and even underlying policy demand.  
Electoral competition is an important concern for European center-left parties because their 
working class base has deteriorated and competition from far-right and far-left parties for 









Electoral Competition and Immigration 
This project examines one of the most important issues facing Europe: The integration of 
the more than twenty million Muslim immigrants and their descendants who reside within the 
borders of the European Union (Johnson 2011).  States across Europe struggle to incorporate 
these populations economically, socially, and politically even though many Muslims have spent 
most or all of their lives in the region.  As xenophobic, far-right parties grow, unemployment, 
perceptions of discrimination, and school drop-out rates among Muslims are also rising (EU 
fundamental Right Agency 2010).  We would expect center-left parties to promote Muslim 
interests and lead integration efforts because these parties are socially liberal and have 
historically represented minorities and people with low socioeconomic status.   
Contrary to these expectations, I show that there is great variability in center-left behavior on 
topics that concern both Muslims and minorities more generally.  While center-left parties set the 
agenda on immigrant integration in some locations, they are largely absent from integration 
policy-making in other areas of the same city.  It is difficult to predict where center-left parties 
will be active on immigrant incorporation because party behavior differs in demographically and 
institutionally similar districts.  These issues are likely to remain unresolved if center-left 
division and inaction persists because other parties often lack the power or will to guide large-
scale incorporation efforts.  Failing to deal adequately with integration will not only impact 
minorities, but will threaten Europe’s overall development and growth.  Unlike most researchers 
who study immigrant integration in Europe by examining national politics, I focus on local-level 
policy-making (See Cesari 2005, Penninx et al 2004 for exceptions).  Local politics are 
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fundamental to understanding incorporation because city governments oversee the majority of 
integration policies in Europe (Ireland 1994).  Even in highly centralized states such as France, 
municipalities regulate issues such as granting mosque building permits, designating land for 
Islamic cemeteries, and instituting job and language training programs.  While existing 
explanations emphasize demographics and institutions, I argue that strategic electoral concerns 
supersede these factors in shaping party behavior on immigrants and minorities.  European 
center-left parties are in a precarious political position because their working class base has 
deteriorated as competition for traditional center-left voters has intensified among parties on the 
far-left and far-right.  Using original data from Berlin, I show that interactions among different 
left parties for power affect center-left integration policy-making, even after controlling for 
demographics and institutions.  Competition for votes from Green parties increases the 
probability that center-left politicians set the agenda on integration, while electoral threat from 
far-left former communist parties decreases this same likelihood.   
The mechanisms underlying these disparate outcomes concern contestation over different 
groups of voters.  Where they compete with the Greens, center-left parties will be inclined to 
augment their integration policy-making to retain minority and progressive support.  In locations 
where the far-left is the main source of competition, center-left parties will be more apt to avoid 
setting the agenda on immigration to retain native blue-collar voters.  Electoral pressure from 
far-right parties does not appear to alter center-left behavior, even though center-left parties 
compete with these parties for native working class support, and concerns over national identity, 
culture, and immigrants motivate this rivalry.   
The existence of progressive, minority, or native working class populations is not 
sufficient to alter center-left behavior.  What matters instead is whether electoral competition 
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from other parties threatens to capture relevant constituencies, forcing center-left parties to adjust 
their behavior to gain or retain their support.  As later sections discuss in more depth, my 
framework relies on center-left perception of electoral threat rather than the actual large-scale 
departure of center-left voters to other parties (although there is evidence that many center-left 
supporters are indeed shifting their support).  Electoral competition indicates that other parties 
are no longer on the political periphery and their continued growth may permanently undermine 
local center-left power.  Center-left parties can ill afford to lose more supporters because their 
working-class base has already shrunk in size.  By evaluating these dynamics, this project 
expands our understanding of how party competition plays out locally, which is an understudied 
topic compared to national level contestation.  Additionally, the relationship between local 
competition and party behavior has implications for research on higher levels of government 
because parliamentary and regional elections often involve “localized” contestation that varies 
across different electoral districts or within the same district over time. 
 
Center-left Political Parties 
While the decline of the Western European center-left is well documented (Kitschelt 
1994, Przeworski & Sprague 1986), this project takes a new approach by focusing on the 
difficulties these parties have with policies that concern Muslims and other minority groups.  
These policies aggravate and compound conflicting demographic and political pressures on the 
center-left because they cut across traditional left-right socioeconomic cleavages.  Consequently, 
center-left parties have no clear strategy for dealing with immigrants because they risk losing 
constituents no matter which plan they employ. 
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Center-left parties in Western Europe are synonymous with social democracy and include 
the British Labor Party, the French Socialists (PS), the Dutch Labor Party (PvdA), the Social 
Democratic Party of Austria (SPO), the Belgian Socialists (PS & SPA), and the German Social 
Democratic Party (SPD).  Recent events throughout Europe demonstrate that these parties 
frequently act against Muslim and minority interests.  As head of the French Socialists, current 
French President Francois Holland endorsed a 2008 high court ruling denying a woman 
citizenship because she wore a full-face veil or niqab (Bennhold 2008).  In 2010, the Belgian 
Socialists joined with other parties in parliament, including the far-right Flemish Interest Party 
(Vlamms Belang), to ban the niqab (Jozwiak 2011).   
Center-left anti-immigrant behavior is not limited to conflicts over veiling, as a PvdA 
government introduced the controversial 1998 Inburgering Laws forcing immigrants to take 
compulsory Dutch culture and language tests (Besselink 2009).  More recently, British Labour 
leader Ed Miliband suggested restricting immigrant access to government housing and benefits 
in 2012 (Wintour 2012).  These actions are puzzling because center-left parties were at the 
forefront of creating anti-discrimination policy to protect minority rights and were the main 
advocates of multiculturalism across Western Europe.  Furthermore, these parties frequently 
have more immigrant and minority politicians than other parties on the left or the right.  These 
behavioral inconsistencies raise an important question:  Why do center-left parties endorse 
immigrant interests in some instances and not in others?   
 
Party Competition 
My project makes unique theoretical and empirical contributions to research on party 
strategy, especially on how newer “niche” parties that emphasize issues outside of traditional 
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socioeconomic appeals are changing electoral politics.  Recent scholarship examines (Art 2007, 
Meguid 2005) how mainstream party behavior affects niche party electoral success in Europe.  
Recognizing that party competition is dynamic and iterative, my approach reverses the direction 
of this relationship and focuses on how smaller parties alter dominant party strategy.  This 
account gives niche parties more power and agency.  While not as strong as longstanding parties 
on the center-left and center-right, these parties are diversifying their platforms and expanding 
their support networks (making them far less “niche”).  The Greens have been most successful at 
this, linking themselves to non-environmental topics such as gender equality, gay rights, and 
social justice.  Far-right parties have also augmented their nativist platforms and frequently are 
anti-European integration, anti-globalization, and anti-Euro crisis austerity programs.   
Given that niche parties have been steady and resilient political actors over the last 
several decades, it is necessary to evaluate how they affect longstanding and traditionally 
dominant centrist parties.  While I examine competition among various party pairs, including 
between mainstream center-left and center-right parties, niche parties are crucial actors that 
complicate the center-left’s electoral playing field.  My findings have implications for party 
behavior on topics other than immigration, as competition is not isolated to these issues.  In fact, 
electoral competition appears to be increasing in Europe and in other developed democracies, as 
voter partisan identities weaken (Dalton & Wattenberg 2000) and new dimensions of 
contestation overtake traditional class-based divides.   
 The empirical strategy I employ in this project is also distinct.  Unlike the majority of 
previous work on party strategy or immigrant integration, I analyze party policy-making 
behavior instead of party rhetoric or carefully crafted manifestos.  Focusing on policy elucidates 
what parties do after they are elected to government and demonstrates that policies do not solely 
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serve programmatic purposes, but are valuable political resources that parties use to gain ground 
on competitors.  While several integration scholars examine local-level integration in Europe, 
their work often involves case studies of particular policy domains, such as mosque building 
(Cesari 2005) or veiling (Van Koningsveld 2005, Soysal 2000, Joppke 1999).  My project offers 
a new approach by quantitatively and qualitatively analyzing a large set of integration policies 
across different policy areas such as education, employment, culture, gender, and language.   
 
Integration Policies 
This project focuses on policies that pertain to the integration of immigrants and their 
offspring in Western Europe.  These policies range from language and job training programs that 
apply generally to all immigrants, to those that target specific groups, such as adding Islamic 
curriculum to public school religion courses or hiring Russian translators at a local job center.  
While many different types of policies may indirectly affect immigrants, I evaluate policies that 
explicitly name and concern these populations.   
The salience of immigrant integration as an issue that shapes voter choice in Western 
Europe appears to be increasing.  More than half of all Europeans believe that there are too many 
immigrants in the region and that immigration negatively impacts their countries, suggesting that 
these views are not limited to the far right (Global Views on Immigration 2011). Concerns over 
growing numbers of immigrants also frequently outweigh anxieties over the EU’s economic 
future (Kellner 2012).  Large Muslim populations are particularly problematic for many 
Europeans from diverse socioeconomic and political backgrounds who believe that Islam 
threatens European liberal values, and that Muslims have a harder time assimilating into 
European society compared to other minority groups  (Modood 2005, Geisser 2003).   
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Integration policies also are politically relevant because they overlap with other 
electorally significant topics such as the economy and crime.  Anti-immigrant sentiment 
increases during economic downturns when immigrants are perceived as competing for jobs and 
squandering valuable resources from the social safety net.  Findings from the European Social 
Survey (ESS) indicate that over 70% of native Europeans think that immigrants make crime 
worse in their countries (ESS 2002), even though migrants and their descendants are no more 
likely to engage in criminal activities than natives with similar socioeconomic status (SES) 
(Albrecht 1997). 
The proposition that electoral competition shapes center-left behavior relies on the 
assumptions that center-left constituencies maintain conflicting views on integration, and that 
dissenting groups have credible exit options and care enough about these issues to shift their 
support to other parties.  A wide spectrum of political interests exists among center-left 
supporters because these parties were the dominant choice of left-leaning western Europeans, 
including blue-collar workers and middle-class progressives, during most of the twentieth 
century.  While the onset of full-fledged “culture wars” may be exaggerated, these groups have 
developed orthogonal preferences on many issues, especially on topics that concern immigrants 
and minorities.  More often than not, progressives support cultural egalitarianism, while working 
class natives oppose state-sponsored cultural diversity.   As I will discuss shortly, members of 
both groups are leaving center-left parties because they disagree their stance on salient issues 
such as immigration.  
Besides dividing center-left constituencies, integration issues reveal significant cleavages 
within center-left parties themselves.  Divergent responses from the German Social Democrats in 
2010, when former SPD Berlin finance minister Thilo Sarrazin published Deutschland schafft 
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sich ab (“Germany does away with itself”), displayed deep party rifts.  The book features anti-
immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric, and is the best selling book in German post-war history 
(Media Control 2010).  What matters about the Sarrazin controversy is not Sarrazin himself, but 
rather the SPD’s uncoordinated and conflicting response.  While some party members, including 
SPD chairman Sigmar Gabriel called for Sarrazin’s ouster, others, like former Federal Minister 
of Education and Science Klaus von Dohnayi, defended his views and right to remain in the 
party.  Ultimately, Sarrazin was only forced to pledge to abide by SPD principles and was not 
expelled.  Although this controversy occurred specifically in Germany, it shows how party 
behavior on topics that concern integration can signal party division and weakness.    
Integration policies not only have political consequences for the center-left, but also 
represent significant challenges facing Europe.  Immigrants and minorities have higher school 
drop-out and unemployment rates, and lower SES across the region (Fleischmann & Dronkers 
2010).  Discrimination and violent attacks against these groups are also increasing (OSI 2010).  
While pundits may overestimate the growth of “parallel societies” that separate minorities from 
natives, the integration of immigrants and their offspring is a real concern that threatens not just 
the livelihood of these groups, but also the future progress and stability of Europe.     
 
The Decline of the Center-left: Demographic Change 
Social democrats rose to power at the beginning of the twentieth century with the support 
of the industrial working class.  But, with recent declines in manufacturing, European center-left 
parties can no longer rely on industrial workers to win elections (Przeworski & Sprague 1986).  
In addition to the erosion of their working class base, immigration has also altered electoral 
politics for center-left parties.  Large-scale immigration to Western Europe began after World 
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War Two when immigrants filled post-war labor shortages or arrived as asylum seekers fleeing 
conflicts in their home countries.  Most immigrants came from Muslim majority countries in 
North Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian Sub-continent, and therefore had an Islamic 
religious and/or cultural background.  Although religiosity varies considerably at the individual 
level, 68% of Muslims in Paris, 88% of Muslims in London, and 85% of Muslims in Berlin 
report that religion is an important part of their daily lives (Nyiri 2007).   
The center-left was a natural ally of Muslims when they first arrived in Europe because 
they were employed as low or semi-skilled laborers.  In fact, unions with direct ties to the center-
left recruited migrant workers across the region (Martiniello 2009, Ireland 2004, Penninx & 
Roosblad 2000, Miller 1981).  Although lack of citizenship limited many migrants’ ability to 
vote, those who could vote supported the center-left because of these parties commitment to 
economic redistribution and social equality (Martiniello 2005, Givens & Leudtke 2000, Saggar 
2000, Messina 1998).  While Muslims continue to vote for Social Democrats over Greens or 
parties on the right, recent evidence suggests that this support is eroding.  During the first round 
of the 2012 French presidential election, many Muslims supported Jean-Luc Melenchon from the 
Left Party and Eva Joly of the Greens (Ryan 2012). Large numbers of Muslim voters also shifted 
their votes from Labour to the Liberal Democrats in the UK’s 2010 general election (Bunglawala 
2010). 
Minorities are moving away from center-left parties because their demands have evolved 
over time.  Immigrants’ primary concerns after arriving in Europe were employment, higher 
wages, housing, and basic subsistence.  Though these issues have not vanished, immigrant 
interests now reflect more aspects of their lives in the host-country.  For many Muslims, this 
means having their religious and cultural needs met, which is evidenced by increased demand for 
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mosques, halal food, and Islamic cemeteries over the last two decades.  Unlike traditional 
working class economic concerns, religious policies do not fit as easily into center-left platforms.  
The center-left’s secular ideological tradition and support for separation of church and state 
complicates policy-making on religious issues.  Regardless of doctrine or denomination, the 
center-left is not a natural ally of religion, and unlike parties on the center-right, the center-left 
lacks a history of supporting religious policies such as teaching religion in schools or 
incorporating religious traditions into public life.   
New economic concerns may further distance Muslims from Social Democrats as 
immigrants, like natives, have lost manufacturing jobs.  Furthermore, many Muslims in Western 
Europe are now small business owners and less likely to endorse conventional center-left 
economic platforms like government intervention in the economy and higher taxes (Sen 2008, 
Berliner Zeitung 2001).   Muslims are also a complex constituency for the center-left because, 
regardless of religious affiliation, immigrants and their offspring participate in politics less than 
natives (Koopmans and Statham 2000, Mahnig & Wimmer 1998).  Muslims, who often have 
comparatively lower socioeconomic standing than other immigrant groups, participate in politics 
even less than non-Muslims (Saggar 2000, Travis 2002).   
While lack of citizenship continues to infringe on voting, European Muslim populations 
are growing rapidly and are on track to double by 2025 (Angenendt 2007, Hutchings 2004).  The 
size and significance of the Muslim vote is therefore likely to increase in the future.  Recent 
evidence suggests that Muslim political participation is already on the rise, especially at the local 
level.  A 2010 report by the Open Society Institute (OSI) finds that 75% of Muslims with 
citizenship in the Berlin area of Kreuzberg participated in the 2006 local election.  This report 
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also shows that both Muslims with and without citizenship had higher levels of non-electoral 
political participation than natives.  
 
The Decline of the Center-left: Political Change 
Besides demographic change, the center-left has witnessed the growth of competition on 
both sides of the political spectrum.  The rise of the Green movement across Western Europe in 
the 1970s diminished the wide appeal of center-left “catch-all” parties by offering left supporters, 
especially socially liberal middle class voters, a viable electoral alternative.  While the Greens 
began as single-issue environmental parties, today they frequently set the agenda on cultural 
issues such as immigrant integration.  Green supporters are often young, urban, highly educated, 
and employed in white-collar service sectors of the economy (Müller-Rommel 2002).  The 
Greens are making significant gains in former center-left strongholds as they diversify their 
platforms and move closer to the center (Dolezal 2010).   
Former radical far-left parties are also challenging the center-left, especially for the 
remaining working class vote.  Many far-left parties such as the Swedish Communists (now the 
Left Party) and the German Socialist Unity Party (also called the Left Party) renounced their 
communist labels and moved to the center after the fall of the Soviet Union.  Others, including 
the Communist parties of Greece, Portugal, and France, and the Dutch Socialist Party, kept their 
names but similarly shed their radical ideologies.  Since the end of the Cold War, far-left parties 
have won parliamentary seats in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
and France (March 2008). 
Far-right parties also compete with the center-left for working class support.  Like the 
Greens, the far-right is relatively new to European politics, forming in the 1990s.  These parties 
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advocate xenophobic, nativist platforms and receive much of their support from white working 
class males from the center-left’s base (Bale et al, 2010; Oesch 2006; Kitschelt & McGann 1997, 
Betz 1993).  The far-right is making significant gains across Europe.  The French National Front 
(FN) received 17.9% of the vote during the first round of the 2012 French presidential election, 
marking the party’s largest vote share since its 1972 formation (Fouquet & Deen 2012).  The 
Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) brought down parliament in 2012 after refusing to support a 
national austerity program.  Meanwhile, the Danish People’s Party (DF) is the third largest party 
in Denmark’s government, and Austria’s Freedom Party (FPO) holds close to 20% of 183 upper 
house seats.   
 
Center-left Policy-making  
What would we expect center-left policy-making on integration to look like given the 
competing interests of workers, immigrants, and progressives, as well as electoral competition 
from the Greens, far-left, and far-right?  According to immigration scholars, center-left parties 
should represent and advocate on behalf of immigrants (Givens & Leudtke 2005, Messina 2007, 
Ireland 2004).  The center-left represents immigrant interests because of its progressive 
ideological tradition and support for policy issues that matter to immigrant constituencies, 
including socioeconomic and racial equality (Saggar 2000, Howard 2009).  If these propositions 
are correct, we should observe center-left parties promoting the interests of all immigrant groups 
regardless of the substance or specificity of their demands.  As discussed earlier, this often is not 
the case. 
The literature’s limitations on center-left behavior stem from two intertwined 
assumptions about immigrants: 1) immigrant working class identities are static and supersede 
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other cleavages and characteristics; 2) immigrants with different ethnic and religious 
backgrounds share the same concerns.  As the above discussion suggests, immigrant economic 
and non-economic preferences change over time, decreasing interest overlap among immigrant 
groups.  Evaluating “immigrants” as a single unit therefore distorts the differences that 
distinguish different populations and limits our ability to understand the unique integration 
challenges they face.   
 
Sociological Theories of Party Behavior 
Sociological theories that focus on how population characteristics influence parties also 
yield expectations of center-left behavior.  Much of this research examines how changing 
cultural and economic conditions shape the electorate’s preferences and therefore impact party 
behavior and electoral success.  Increasing education levels (Kitschelt 1989), youth populations 
(Barnes and Kaase et al 1979), and post-materialist values (Inglehart 1977, 1990) are frequently 
argued to be significant societal-level factors.  Issue salience is exogenous to politics, and parties 
respond to changes within their constituencies.  Accordingly, we should expect center-left parties 
to react to the demographic contexts they encounter.  In locations where there are enough 
immigrant and/or progressive voters for center-left parties to build winning coalitions, these 
parties will advocate for immigrants.  Where native workers predominate, the center-left will not 
set the agenda on immigrant issues to avoid alienating working class supporters.  
Policy-making across the independent district governments of Berlin’s twelve 
municipalities (Bezirke), which are the focus of this project, demonstrates that demographics do 
not fully explain center-left behavior.  Consider the Bezirke of Mitte and Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg, which have some of the largest immigrant populations in Berlin.  Turkish Muslims 
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are the predominant immigrant group in both locations and their citizenship rates are similar at 
around forty percent.  These districts also consistently have the city’s highest levels of 
unemployment and are geographically concentrated in Berlin’s urban core (see figure 1).   
Although we might expect the SPD to produce a similar amount of immigrant policies in 
these locations because they have comparable demographics, SPD behavior varies considerably.  
Here, “party behavior” refers to the act of proposing a policy.  Even if not all policies pass and 
become law, policy proposal allows parties to set the agenda and signals that they are committed 
to certain issues.1  The SPD is not the dominant agenda setter on immigrant issues in Mitte, even 
though it has large immigrant populations.  Instead, the Greens outnumber the SPD on 
integration policies by more than two to one.  Comparatively, the SPD in Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg is one of the top integration policy producing parties and drafts about the same 
number of integration policies as the Greens (40% and 45% respectively).  Table One2 shows 
that SPD behavior not only varies in these districts, but also differs across Berlin’s ten other 
municipalities.  While the total number of integration policies is generally greater in locations 
with more immigrants, SPD behavior does not follow a consistent pattern across these locations.  
 




                                                
1 I do not examine voting behavior because most policies that come up for a vote end up passing.  
This selection effect distorts party preferences on immigrant policy issues, making policy 
proposal a more accurate indicator.     
2 The content and coding of the policies that compose Table One is discussed in depth in chapter 
two.    
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Political Opportunity Framework  
Immigration scholars who apply the political opportunity approach to the study of 
immigrant integration argue that different institutional variables explain variance in immigrant 
incorporation across Western Europe.  These factors include naturalization procedures (Garbaye 
2001), electoral laws (Guiraudon 1998), and national norms (Brubaker 1992, Bleich 1998, Favell 
1998).   While opportunity structure approaches offer useful insights for evaluating cross-
national variation, these institutions remain constant across Berlin’s districts and therefore cannot 
explain variability in SPD behavior.  All twelve districts have the same electoral and political 
institutions and neither citizenship nor national identity norms change from one district to the 
next.  Yet, the central claim that institutions matter may still be accurate if we evaluate context 
specific institutions, such as local inter-party coalitions, that differ among districts.  Later 
empirical sections examine these institutions, and show that they neither alter center-left 
behavior nor disrupt established relationships between party competition and center-left policy-
making.   
 
Party Competition  
Demographic and opportunity structure frameworks cannot fully explain center-left party 
behavior because they overlook the discretion parties have to bring particular issues to the 
forefront and to cultivate linkages with different groups of constituents.  The framework I 
develop focuses on how strategic electoral concerns permeate the policy arena, and how these 
interests, rather than demographics, institutions, or even underlying policy demand, affect the 
type and number of policies parties ultimately produce.  My approach begins with the premise 
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that parties are strategic actors with the power to set their own agendas and adapt to different 
environments.  From Downs (1957) to more recent work on party interaction and development 
(See Adams, Merrill, & Grofman 2005 for a survey of the literature), scholars frequently 
recognize the strategic nature of party behavior.  But unlike previous work, I argue that party 
strategy is highly flexible and varies based on context-specific electoral incentives and 
constraints.  Although they may legislate on similar issues during overlapping time periods, 
members of the same party may produce very different policies because they face distinct forms 
of party competition.   
Party competition refers to strategic interactions among parties for power.  The 
framework I develop relies on the notion that parties compete for office and even “safe” seats are 
susceptible to potential challengers.  Political parties must receive constituents’ support, which 
they frequently obtain through the act of policymaking, to gain and maintain power.  The basic 
assumption is that, if a politician creates a policy that appeals to a particular group of 
constituents, then this group is more likely to support him in the next election.  While it is 
difficult to direct public goods policies at specific groups, other policy types can be politicized 
and used to garner support.  
Politicians’ use of policies to gain votes is a strategic decision rather than an automatic 
response or recognition of constituent demand.  Political parties often cannot simultaneously 
appeal to different constituencies and compete with other parties for the same groups.  
Consequently, parties face tradeoffs over what types of policies to put forward and support.  
Political parties rarely pursue only policy, office, or votes, but attempt to balance these different 
and at times competing goals (Muller & Strom 1999).  Parties may use policies instrumentally to 
 17 
attract supporters or to further their own programmatic agendas (Budge & Laver 1986).  While 
this project focuses on the former, these goals are not mutually exclusive.   
Demographics are not absent from my framework, but they do not predetermine party 
behavior.  The mere presence or absence of particular populations does not dictate a party’s rise 
or fall, or its policy behavior once elected.  What matters instead is how parties respond to and 
use changing demographic and political conditions to their advantage.  Parties must decide which 
constituencies are important for getting elected and how they will appeal these groups.  Electoral 
competition alters a party’s decision calculus because it signals that a particular population is 
politically relevant and may be acquired by other parties.  For instance, if the Green party is 
gaining support in a district, this indicates to the SPD that the Greens have already mobilized a 
certain level of progressive voters.  It is reasonable for SPD politicians to assume that the Greens 
have poached some of their constituents because most progressives once voted for the SPD.  The 
threat of losing more voters motivates the SPD to alter its behavior to avoid being completely 
overtaken by the Greens.  If the SPD waits to act until the Greens gain more support, it may be 
too late for them to regain power.   
Compare this situation to a district with a similar number of progressives, but without a 
viable Green party.  Here, the SPD does not have the same incentive to appeal to progressives 
because their support appears stable.  While the SPD may still subtly court these voters, the party 
lacks a catalyst to increase these appeals without party competition from the Greens.  Outreach 
decision are complicated by the fact that political parties have incomplete information about the 
size and mobilization of different constituencies and therefore can never be certain if targeting a 
particular group will ultimately produce votes.  Additionally, parties must consider both current 
and future constituencies, like Muslims, who will likely become more significant political actors 
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as their numbers grow across Europe.  While center-left parties may miss the chance to align 
themselves with Muslims if they do not act now, actively targeting Muslims is a gamble because 
no one can be sure that whether such a strategy will alienate more supporters than it will gain.    
 
Progressive Voters and Integration  
In this project, the term “progressive” refers to individuals on the politically left who 
support the expansion of civil and political rights, as well as government intervention in social 
issues such as poverty, education, and health care.  These “social liberals” contrast with 
“classical liberals” who endorse a more limited government to protect individual freedoms.  Two 
general perspectives on the state accommodation of ethnic and religious diversity exist among 
progressive voters and public and scholarly debates on multiculturalism get at the heart of this 
divide.   This division concerns a central question: Should governments promote individual 
freedom by encouraging immigrants and minorities to maintain their cultural identities even if 
these values conflict with national norms (therefore promoting multiculturalism)?  Or, should 
governments create policies that compel members of these groups to shed (at least in public) 
these identities in favor of national norms even if they conflict with their religious and cultural 
traditions (consequently discouraging multiculturalism)?   
The topic of multiculturalism has received significant scholarly attention from 
researchers such as Kymlicka (2007, 2006, 2003) and Banting (2010, 2005, 1999), and Madood 
(2013, 2008).  Given this vast body work, as well as the fact that data on progressive voters’ 
views on multiculturalism does not exist for Berlin, I do not spent significant time dealing with 
these debates here.  Instead, I treat progressive support for integration policy as an empirical 
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rather than normative issue by creating clearly defined coding rules that classify integration 
policies into pro-immigrant, anti-immigrant, and neutral categories (please refer to the “Data” 
section in Chapter Two for an in-depth discussion of coding).  
To more accurately represent what Muslims actually perceive as promoting or impairing 
their interests, I base these coding rules on my conversations with fifteen3 Muslim political and 
religious leaders from different ethnic and religious traditions -- ranging from the secular to the 
devout – in Berlin. These interviews focused on specific policies that were not clearly pro, anti, 
or neutral (which represent less than 2% of all policies in the dataset).  A prime example is 
policy 1413/XVIII that the SPD proposed in the Berlin district of Neukölln, which “disallows the 
Islamic group Milli Gorus from having a public platform in the district.”  This law essentially 
prohibits Milli Gorus, a religiously conservative Turkish Muslim diaspora organization, from 
holding rallies, meetings, celebrations or any event on public property within Neukölln’s 
borders.   
It is difficult to classify policy 1413/XVIII because arguments can be made in favor of 
coding it both anti or pro-immigrant.  Is it “anti-immigrant” because it limits the rights of an 
immigrant organization?  Or, do Muslim immigrants view restrictions on the organization as 
appropriate controls of an extremist group that only a minority of German Muslims support?  
While this question was difficult for many respondents (especially secular Muslims who did not 
endorse Milli Gorus) to answer, ultimately they all agreed that the policy was anti-immigrant 
because government was placing unfair and unprecedented restrictions on Milli Gorus.  While 
                                                
3 Given time and budgetary constraints, conducting fifteen interviews allowed me to speak with 
multiple (on average 3) individuals with various religious and cultural backgrounds, and 
triangulate the information they provided.    
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other policies were less clear-cut, I relied on the majority (or plurality) perspective to make final 
coding decisions.4     
 
Who Competes?  
Political competition functions at all levels of government and between different party 
dyads.  For federal elections, the center-left’s main competitor may be the center-right, but at the 
regional level they may face the far-left, and the Greens locally.  Parties also frequently 
encounter multiple sources of competition at once.  As Chapter Two shows, party organization 
and structure affects the latitude smaller party units have to depart from their party’s platforms 
and respond to localized competition. Yet, internal party dynamics cannot explain policy 
variability within parties because identical institutional rules govern members of the same party. 
Political parties compete with each other in many different ways.  They can raise more 
money, conduct stronger outreach campaigns, and craft better public images than competitors.  
As this project shows, parties can also use policies strategically to succeed over rivals.  Party 
competition involves the aggregation of these different forms of behavior, as well as 
organizational resources and previous relationships with constituents.  Voter partisan loyalties 
may impede party efforts to acquire supporters from competitors, but as pointed out earlier, the 
strength of party attachments is fading across Europe and in other developed democracies 
(Dalton and Wattenberg 2000).  The weakening of party-voter relationships heightens 
competition among parties because it increases the pool of independent voters over which parties 
fight, and makes parties work harder to maintain the supporters they do have.    
                                                
4 Please direct coding questions of specific policies to the author at jpbray@umich.edu.  
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Political competition in Western Europe has also increased as a result of the shift from a 
one to a multi-dimensional policy space (Kitschelt 1988).  Party competition during most of the 
twentieth century was restricted to subtle adjustments along the standard left-right 
socioeconomic continuum.  Parties decided between moving closer (“convergence”) or farther 
(“divergence”) from nearby competitors to win more votes (Downs 1957).  The emergence of 
new political issues, such as the environment and integration, as well as the decline of traditional 
class and religious societal divisions, means that parties must now consider how to compete with 
once distant party rivals.  Competition between unlikely party pairs, such as far-right and far-left 
parties for native blue-collar workers, is well documented in the European context (Hooghe, 
Marks, Wilson 2002, Sitter 2002).  Yet, recent evidence shows that political competition in 
Western Europe is becoming even more erratic as some far-right parties make pro-environment 
appeals (Pfaffinger 2012).  While these parties are likely championing environmental issues to 
soften their image rather than to attract progressive Green supporters, they are nonetheless 
encroaching on traditionally “Green” policy space.    
Parties must weigh the costs and benefits of taking on new issues.  Given limited time 
and resources, putting one issue at the top of the agenda often means moving other topics down 
the list.  Policies that starkly divide sizable constituencies, such as immigration, complicate party 
decision making because promoting these issues will likely gain some supporters while 
invariably losing others.  Yet, remaining silent may also cost parties the chance to link 
themselves to issues that are relevant to voters.  A party’s decision calculus on what policies to 
pursue is imperfect because although some issues are clearly more salient than others, it is 
impossible to know how voters will respond until policies are actually created.  Once policies are 
made, it is difficult to undo party ties to certain issues because these relationships are sticky in 
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the minds of voters (Petrocik 1996).  The British Conservatives are still trying to distance 
themselves from Enoch Powel’s 1968 “Rivers of Blood” speech that disparaged minorities and 
immigrants living in Britain.  Even though Powell may have been an outlier among fellow party 
members, public memory is long and Conservatives continue to struggle to recruit minorities 
because of Powell’s legacy (Wind-Cowie 2011, Ashcroft 2012).  
 
The German Social Democratic Party  
Examining the recent history of the SPD reveals how demographic change, the de-
alignment of traditional cleavages, and new forms of party competition complicate politics for 
center-left parties.  The SPD was Germany’s main non-revolutionary left party during most of 
the twentieth century.  Its support came from non-Catholic industrial workers and intellectuals in 
urban areas who favored economic equality and progressive social causes.  Since the 1970s, the 
number of blue-collar workers in Germany has declined from 50% to less than 30% of the 
workforce (Cook 2001).  Consequently, the SPD can no longer win elections by relying solely on 
working class support.   
 The SPD still depends on the remaining working class vote even though these 
constituencies have diminished.  The growth of the far-left Linke party and far-right parties such 
as the National Democratic Party (NPD) make it is difficult for the SPD to retain this support 
because both parties appeal to native workers.  The Linke has a unique claim to the working class 
because it descends from the former East German Communist Party (SED) and its post-1989 
successor, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS).  Although communism was once a scar on 
the Linke’s past, the party has reinvented itself and now represents modern-day working class 
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concerns.  During the Eurozone financial crisis, Linke party leaders frequently spoke against the 
failures of capitalism and globalization, and weakening the social safety net in the name of 
austerity.  The Linke is different from other far-left parties because it is the only party in Western 
Europe to serve in a communist regime.  While this legacy is not a necessary precondition for 
far-left parties to make authentic and successful working class appeals, the Linke’s institutional 
history and organizational resources likely increase its power and competitiveness relative to 
other Western European far-left parties.   
Far-right parties like the NPD, German Peoples Unions (DVU), and Republicans have 
not broken the 5% electoral threshold to win Bundestag seats, but have served in state-level 
parliaments in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Brandenberg, and are active within local 
governments across Germany.  Two new far-right parties, Pro-Deutschland (started by former 
CDU members) and the Freedom Party (with ties to the far-right Freedom Party in the 
Netherlands) also competed in Berlin’s 2011 municipal elections.  The percent of the total far-
right municipal vote has steadily increased from 2.63% in the 2001 election, to 3.08% and 4.47% 
of the vote in 2006 and 2011 respectively (Berlin Whal 2011).  While far-right support comes 
from both the right and the left, their gains are frequently at the expense of the SPD’s working 
class vote.   
The SPD is also facing challenges from the Greens for progressives and minorities.  The 
German Green movement began in the 1970s when environmentalists, peace activists, and 68ers 
joined forces.  In 1993 the Greens gained ground in former East Germany by merging with 
Alliance 90, which was a political movement that was instrumental in ending communism.  
Today, the Greens are a leading voice for social equality and diversity as they expand their 
platforms to include topics outside of the environment.  While Green vote share continues to 
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increase steadily across Berlin’s district councils, they are also gaining support throughout 
Germany and now have more than ten percent of Bundestag seats (See Markovits & Gorski 1993 
for an in-depth look at the development of the German Green Party).   
At times the SPD may also encounter competition from the center-right CDU for Muslim 
constituents.  Like the SPD, the CDU is a sizeable party that unites voters with disparate 
interests.  A subset of the CDU, like the founders of Pro-Deutschland, clearly do not favor 
immigrant interests.  Yet other CDU members endorse integration issues, especially those that 
concern religion.  During the 2009 “pro-religion” referendum on teaching religion in Berlin 
public school, the CDU joined with Muslim organizations to make religion courses mandatory.  
Besides convergence on religious topics, many Muslims maintain socially conservative views 
that align with these parties.  Center-right parties realize the strategic significance of minority 
voters and are increasing their appeals to minorities across Europe (Bale 2009).      
 
Observable Implications  
I now explore several hypotheses for how electoral competition affects center-left 
integration policy-making.  While these propositions concern the center-left and particular party 
pairs, center-left parties may also encounter competition from multiple parties at the same time.  
I treat this issue empirically because it is difficult to set clear theoretical expectations of party 
behavior across all combinations of party competition.  The theoretical starting point for these 
hypotheses is that electoral competition from the different political parties increases or decreases 
the probability of SPD integration policy-making.  The direction of this relationship depends on 
which party exerts an electoral threat on the SPD.  Competition from the far-left, center-right, 
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far-right, and Greens alters SPD behavior in particular ways, which I specify in great depth 
below.   
Even though these parties alter SPD behavior in particular ways, the same general 
mechanism undergirds their relationship with SPD policy-making.  This mechanism concerns the 
threat that these parties will appropriate constituencies who are integral to the SPD electoral 
success.  While different groups of voters are at risk depending on the type of party competition 
the SPD encounters, the perception of losing these supporters motivates to the SPD to make (or 
as the case may be, not make) integration policy.  Electoral competition has the power the 
influence SPD behavior because the SPD is in a precarious political position:  Like other center-
left parties in the region, the SPDs working class base has deteriorated and the SPD is no longer 
the primary electoral choice for voters on the left.  Losing more supporters to electoral rivals 
therefore exacerbates pre-existing weaknesses within the SPD and will undoubtedly further 
reduce their political and electoral power.   
As mentioned above, different forms of party competition have particular relationships 
with SPD policy behavior.  This section walks through the logic of how and why different forms 
of competition affect SPD policy-making and lays out four hypotheses that concretely connect 
party competition and SPD integration policy.  Both center and far-left parties compete for the 
support of native working-class voters and as discussed above, these constituencies often do not 
support integration policy.  A competitive far-left party signals an electorally significant working 
class that the SPD may lose to the far-left if they do not actively cater to this constituencies 
preferences.  In an effort to retain these supports, the SPD will be less likely to set the agenda on 
immigration issues in locations where the center-left faces a far-left threat.   
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Like far-left parties, the far-right depends on the support of native industrial workers.  
Consequently, a similar logic undergirds the relationship between competition from the far-right 
and SPD integration policy.  Far-right parties that win enough votes to come into government 
signal that native working class populations are sizable, mobilized and electorally significant.  
Therefore, in locations where the center-left faces a far-right threat, they will be less likely to set 
the agenda on immigrant issues to retain these voters.   
Unlike competition from far-left or right, electoral threat from the Green Party increases 
the likelihood of SPD integration policy-making.  The rationale here is that Green competition 
indicates that progressive middle class and/or minority populations exist and are mobilized.  Not 
only are they politicaly active, but a portion of these voters have already given their support to 
the Greens. Fearing further vote losses to the Greens, the center-left will increase agenda setting 
on integration issues because progressive and minority voters endorse this behavior.   
The relationship between center-right competition and SPD integration policy-making 
depends on the type of center-right party local SPD councilors encounter.  As my data indicate, 
there is a large amount of variance in center-right stance on immigrants:  In some locations the 
CDU actively supports integration and in others they oppose these issues. For example, the  
CDU advocates for including Islam in public school religious coursework, building mosques, 
and . Yet, in other locations the CDU aims to prohibit Turkish language from being spoken by 
students on public school property and oppose accommodating Muslim cultural traditions during 
local naturalization ceremonies. Like the SPD, the CDU must decide if and how it wants to 
appeal to different constituencies and as noted earlier, we observe the center-right increasing 
their outreach effort to immigrants and minorities.  In locations where the CDU is “pro-
immigrant,” the SPD will increase its support for immigrant issues to compete for minority 
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voters.  In short, center-right party that appeals to minority groups via integration policies 
demonstrates that they perceive an electorally significant minority population. Conversely, 
competition from center-right parties that do not endorse integration policies will not affect 
center-left policymaking behavior on these issues because they do not risk losing minority voters 
to the center-right.     
If these expectations are correct, we should observe the following hypotheses:    
H1. Competition from the far-left will decrease the likelihood of center-
left policy-making on immigrant integration.   
 
H2. Competition from the far-right will decrease the likelihood of center-
left integration policies.  
 
H3. Competition from the Greens will increase the likelihood of center-left 
agenda setting on integration policies. 
   
H4. Competition from center-right parties that endorse integration policies 
will increase center-left support for these issues. 
 
This approach does not assume that center-left behavior is purely reactive or that these 
parties wait for other parties to make (or as the case may be, not make) immigrant policies.  On 
the contrary, there may be a significant first mover advantage for center-left policy-making on 
immigrant issues.  For instance, setting the agenda on immigrant issues demonstrates issue 
ownership that may attract progressives and minorities before they join Green competitors.  
While this project focuses on center-left behavior, party competition is a cyclical process that 
affects all parties.  The center-left not only responds to the electoral threat from other parties, but 
other parties attempt to counter the center-left through their own strategic policy-making 
behavior.   
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Policy Supply Vs. Demand 
The party competition framework I develop emphasizes mechanisms that focus on policy 
supply instead of policy demand.  “Demand” refers to the pressure individuals or groups exert on 
governments for particular policies, and  “supply” concerns government policy production.  
Comparatively, both sociological and opportunity structure theories of party behavior emphasize 
policy supply.  Demographic changes alter voter policy preferences in sociological approaches 
and institutions shape the ways voters lobby the state in the political opportunity framework.  
While supply and demand are intimately related, the policy “market” is imperfect and many 
polices constituents want do not translate into what governments actually supply.  
Examining the supply-side of policy-making becomes even more important when we 
consider how incorporation policy is made in Berlin.  City councilors, rather than citizens, 
introduce the vast majority of these policies.  Although citizens have opportunities at each 
council meeting to address policy issues through “resident requests” (Einwohnerinnenanfrag), 
only thirteen requests on immigrant integration were made during the period under examination.  
This represents less than two percent of the 784 policies made by parties.  How much “behind 
the scenes” influence do constituents exert on city councilor behavior?  Although residents can 
call, email, or meet directly with politicians, my interviews with over fifty councilors from 
different districts across Berlin indicate that this type of participation is rare among both natives 
and immigrants (interviews with author in 2010 & 2011).  Evidence from other regional and 
local governments in Germany indicates that immigrant participation is also limited.  It is 
uncommon for district and regional governments to work with immigrant organizations to make 
or implement policy (Hunger et al 2011).  These findings suggest that previously discussed 
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increases in local immigrant political participation occur outside of traditional political 
institutions such as city governments.   
 
Summary of Findings 
I show empirically that competition from the different parties on the left has discernable 
and distinct relationships with SPD policy behavior.  Green electoral threat induces the SPD to 
increase integration policy-making and competition from the Linke decreases this behavior.  
These results remain robust when demographic and institutional variables are added to the 
estimations.  Including controls for different content and ethnic themes also reinforces these 
findings and similar trends predominate across different policy issues.  Interestingly, electoral 
threat from the Linke decreases SPD integration policy-making generally, and specifically on 
policies that concern Muslim ethnic groups such as Turks and Arabs.  Yet, the SPD is more 
rather than less likely (relative to policies without this content) to make Muslim ethnic policies 
when Linke competition is not present.   Finally, competition from a pro-immigrant CDU has 
distinguishable effects on SPD policy proposal on topics such as education, culture, and jobs.   
 
Berlin’s Significance & Broader Implications 
Immigration patterns in Western Europe caused migrants to settle in large urban areas.  
Berlin has some of the most sizable immigrant and Muslim populations in the region.  Close to 
half of Berlin’s 3.4 million residents have a foreign background and more than 300,000 Muslims 
live in the city (Statistik Berlin Brandenberg 2010).  This outnumbers Muslim communities in 
other parts of Germany, and in Paris, Brussels, Vienna, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, and 
Stockholm.  A central objective of this project is to understand how integration policy affects 
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European Muslims.  Given that local integration is understudied, it is reasonable to begin 
evaluating locations like Berlin where many Muslims actually reside.   
Berlin’s history as a divided city and status as a city-state make it a unique German city.  
Being one of three city-states means that Berlin lacks an extra level of government that is present 
in other German cities.  A city like Cologne has district councils and sends delegates to the North 
Rhine-Wastfalia state parliament (Landtag), but also has an additional city-wide council 
(Stadtverwaltung) that exists between the state and district governments.  Comparatively, Berlin 
only has district councils and the state-level Berlin House of Representatives 
(Abgeordnetenhaus).  This institutional difference does not limit the applicability of findings 
from Berlin to other parts of Germany because this extra level of government does not greatly 
impact how district councils function.  Local governments across Germany essentially have the 
same responsibilities, especially in regard to integration.5 
Even with a unique history and institutional makeup, findings from Berlin are 
generalizable to other parts of Germany and Western Europe more broadly because Berlin’s 
districts are similar to districts in other large, globalized cities.  Cologne, Munich, Frankfurt, and 
even Amsterdam, Paris, and London have districts with many migrants and others that are mostly 
occupied by natives.  They also have districts with better economic conditions and those that 
have high levels of unemployment.  Perhaps most fundamental for the theory developed here, 
center-left parties face various political party rivals across different locations in these cities.  The 
party competition approach can therefore be used to evaluate center-left behavior in places 
outside of Berlin.  Given that institutional and historical differences may alter the dynamics of 
                                                
5 Unlike district governments in non-city states, Berlin’s district councils do not have taxation 
powers and rely on the Berlin House of Representatives for funds (interviews 2011).   
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party competition in other locations, the theory should be evaluated using data from different 
cities in future research.  
 
Road Map 
The next section of my dissertation empirically tests the hypotheses laid out in this 
chapter.  It begins with a brief discussion of the data collection process I undertook for this 
project.  Then I provide coding information and descriptive statistics before testing my party 
competition framework as well as alternative hypotheses.   Chapter Three takes a closer look at 
SPD policy-making behavior using qualitative data to explicate the mechanism that cause the 
SPD to be active on integration in some locations and not in others.  Here I trace similar policies 
through districts that are demographically and institutionally alike, but where Green and Linke 
party power differ.   Using my interviews, government administrative records, and information 
from local news sources, this analysis elucidates the mechanisms underlying differences in SPD 
behavior across similar policy issues.  Chapter Four concludes by discussing the theoretical 
implications of my findings, prospects for future research, and taking a closer look at how 








Left Party Competition in Berlin 
 
Governments across Europe are working to integrate the more than 31.4 million people, 
or six percent of the region, born outside of an EU member state (Vasileva 2011).  Rising levels 
of immigrant unemployment and discrimination against minorities following the Euro-zone 
financial crisis further complicates this already onerous task (Papademetriou, Sumption, & 
Tarrazas 2010, Collete 2011).  I show empirical evidence in this chapter that politicians do not 
simply respond to demand-side variables, such as demographics or institutions, when making 
integration policy.  Instead, electoral threat from smaller parties on the left exerts distinct 
pressures on mainstream center-left parties and yields specific policy outcomes.  While Green 
competition increases the likelihood of SPD integration policy-making, competition from the 
Linke decreases this behavior.  Even though we might expect center-left competition to involve 
traditional center-right rivalries, or competition from newer far-right parties for the center-left’s 
working-class base, it appears to be mostly isolated among parties on the left.  These findings are 
robust across different model specifications and after controlling for demographics, institutions, 
and different content and ethnic policy themes.  Despite the fact that they are historically 
dominant and have large support bases, European center-left parties are vulnerable to electoral 
competition from rising smaller parties.  We might overlook the power these parties have 
because they frequently get lower vote percentages and rarely control government.  Yet, as this 
chapter shows, smaller parties do not need to be large in size or even outnumber mainstream 




The original data I collected for this project come from the twelve district parliaments 
(Bezirksverordnetenversammlung) that govern Berlin at the local level.  Each district, or Bezirk, 
has its own fifty-five-person council that serves a five year term.  The councils follow the same 
electoral and institutional rules.  City councilors are elected from closed party lists and seat share 
is determined proportionally (using D’Hondt seat allocation).   District governments hold 
independent monthly meetings that are open to the public.  Together with a team of research 
assistants, I carefully reviewed and coded relevant policies from the minutes of each council 
meetings held between the 2006 and 2011.  The data provide useful insights even though they 
capture a specific period of policy-making because no district has significantly outpaced other 
districts on immigrant integration.  At least two separate individuals independently found and 
coded each policy, and these codings were checked and cross-referenced to ensure inter-coder 
reliability.6 I am confident the dataset contains most, if not all integration policies made during 
this period, and any policies that may be absent are missing at random and therefore not sensitive 
to selection bias. 
Immigrant integration is a relatively new topic for governing bodies across Europe, 
especially for local level councils and parliaments.  During the early years of resettlement, policy 
makers believed that long-term integration programs were unnecessary because migrants would 
return to their home countries.  This began to change during the global economic downturn of 
the 1970s when states across Europe rapidly closed their borders.  Immigrants had their families 
join them rather than return home because they feared future restrictions on traveling in an out of 
                                                
6 Please direct data collection or coding questions to the author at jpbray@umich.edu 
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the region.  Family reunifications laid the groundwork for permanent settlement and most 
immigrants who moved to Europe during the second half of the twentieth century remain there 
today.  Although it took several decades for politicians to acknowledge the permanence of 
migrant populations, integration is currently a prominent political topic across Europe.  Recent 
controversies, such as the killings of Dutch anti-immigrant politician Pim Fortuyn (2002), the 
London transit bombings (2004), riots in the Paris suburbs (2005 & 2007), and Anders Breivik 
murders in Norway (2011), have increased the salience of these issues.   
In the data analysis that follows, integration policies are the unit of analysis and each 
observation is a policy.  Six hundred and twenty eight pro-immigrant policies are made during 
the period under examination.  Table One, which was introduced earlier, shows the distribution 
of policies across districts.  As a point of reference, integration policies compose approximately 
ten percent of total policy-making on average within districts.  The data in Table One come from 
“pro-immigrant” policies that support immigrants by providing resources for integration into the 
host country.  These resources may develop immigrants’ own skillset via language or job 
training courses, or accommodate immigrants by hiring bilingual public employees and creating 
government programs expressly for these groups.  Pro-immigrant policies may also symbolically 
acknowledge immigrant religious and cultural traditions and offer legal protection against 
discrimination based on these customs.   
More than eighty percent of the data are pro-immigrant policies. Yet, anti-immigrant and 
neutral policies also exist.  Anti-immigrant policies limit immigrant rights and legal protections, 
or discontinue existing integration programs.  Examples include prohibiting immigrants from 
speaking languages other than German on public school property, and ending the lottery system 
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that allows foreign students to attend better preforming public schools.7  Policies that gather 
information on topics such as immigrant demographics and local naturalization rates are coded 
as neutral because they are used for fact-finding, and are neither clearly pro nor anti.  The far-
right National Democratic Party (NPD) makes more than half of all anti-immigrant policies.  
But, the CDU is also active on these issues.  Given the limited number of anti and neutral 
policies, the empirical analysis that follows focuses on pro-immigrants policy-making.  Later 
chapters qualitatively examine both pro and anti immigrant party behavior in more depth.   
 
Research Design 
This analysis aggregates data gathered across the different districts to understand general 
trends in SPD behavior.  While we can observe how SPD politicians in one district deal with a 
particular policy issue, we cannot repeat reality to see how SPD members in other locations 
would respond to exactly the same set of circumstances.  Consider the district of Pankow, which 
encountered local opposition to the building of the Khadija Mosque in 2007.  The mosque 
generated significant controversy because it was the first mosque built in East Berlin and was 
attacked by arsons during construction.  Although Pankow’s SPD ultimately endorsed the 
project, it is unclear if SPD councilors in other districts would have done the same, especially 
since the SPD does not always support new mosques.  Evaluating districts together, rather than 
focusing on district-specific examples, provides a more nuanced assessment of SPD behavior.       
Combining data from different districts generates an important question: How similar is 
policy-making within districts compared to policy-making across districts?  The intra-cluster 
                                                
7 The first example comes from policy 0402/3 proposed by the CDU in the district of 
Charlottenberg-Wilmersdrof.  The second example is policy 1537/XVIII from the CDU in the 
district of Neukölln.   
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correlation (ICC), which measures correspondence in clustered data, helps to answer this 
question. The ICC is the between-cluster variance divided by the sum of the within-cluster and 
between-cluster variance.  An ICC value of one shows that all the observations within a cluster 
(district) are identical, effectively reducing the sample size to the number of clusters.  A very 
small ICC (standardly set at .06 or smaller) suggests that the within cluster variance is greater 
than the between cluster variance, and an ICC of zero signals that responses within a cluster do 
not correlate.  The ICC for SPD behavior across Berlin’s twelve districts is .027, indicating that 
the variance within districts is high enough to treat each policy, rather than each district, as a 
case.8  
A dichotomous measure of center-left policy creation serves as the dependent variable to 
examine why the SPD sets the agenda on pro immigrant policy in some locations and not in 
others.  Policies proposed by the SPD take on a value of one and policies created by other 
political parties equal zero.  The SPD makes less than one-third of all pro-immigrant policies 
(see Table Two).  All independent variables can be placed into the three general categories of 
demographics, institutions, and party competition.  Demographic variables measure aspects of 
districts where policies are made and represent unique attributes of each district.  They include 
the size of the Muslim and former USSR populations, the percent of Muslims with citizenship, 
and controls for unemployment and east/west Berlin.  Table Three provides detailed coding and 
descriptive information for each variable.  
Table Two about here 
 
Table Three about here 
 
 
                                                
8 District fixed effects are not included in estimations because of collinearity.   
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The Muslim population variable measures immigrants or their offspring who come from 
Muslim majority countries.  Muslims on average comprise about 10.5% of each district’s 
population.  Turks are the predominant Muslim ethnic group, but smaller populations from North 
Africa and the Middle East are also present.  Besides ethnicity, denomination and level of 
observance varies among Muslims at the individual level.  Berlin also has large numbers of 
ethnic Germans born in the former Soviet Union.  Approximately three percent of district 
populations on average are Aussiedler from Eastern Europe.  Measures of specific immigrant 
groups are used instead of a single foreign population indicator because combining these groups 
may distort the diversity of their interests and influence on policy.9  Forty six percent of Muslims 
on average have citizenship in Berlin.  This figure coincides with Muslim citizenship across 
Germany more generally.10  A citizenship measure for USSR populations is not included because 
most Aussiedler are citizens.  Compared to immigrants without German heritage, it is relatively 
easier for ethnic Germans to naturalize.  Berlin’s mean unemployment rate from 2007 to 2011 is 
14.5%, which is used instead of annual figures that do not fluctuate greatly from year to year.  
Half of the districts are in former East Berlin and the other half reside in the west.       
 
Estimations  
I estimate several logistic regression models with SPD pro-immigrant policy proposal as 
the dependent variable in the multivariate analysis that follows.  A basic logistic regression is 
chosen instead of a multilevel model because the p-value for the likelihood ratio test comparing 
                                                
9 Replacing Muslim and USSR measures with an aggregate foreign indicator does not alter the 
size or direction of estimation results.  The Foreign population measure could not be included in 
addition to the Muslim and USSR variables because of the high correlation among variables.     
10 German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees reports 45% of Muslims in Germany are 
citizens.   
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these models is one, indicating that the data is not over-dispersed and therefore sufficiently 
described by the simple logistic regression (coinciding with the low ICC discussed earlier).11  
Even though district effects are minimal, all estimations use clustered standard errors to provide 
the most conservative standard error estimates.  Standard errors are clustered on district*year 
instead district because time trends in the data show that fewer policies are made in the years 
following and preceding elections (see Graph One).  Even though the ICC for district*year is 
only .032, clustering serves to rectify any remaining non-independence.12  The data are treated as 
a cross section of policies within a single policy-making period rather than time series 
observations because the limited number of policies per year make it difficult to evaluate the data 
at specific time intervals.  In results not shown, all the models are estimated with year fixed 
effects.  None of the time measures are statistically significant and their inclusion does not 
greatly alter any of the models, suggesting that time is not an omitted variable.13 
  Table Four’s first column shows estimation results for the full demographic model.  We 
should observe more immigrant policies in heavily populated immigrant districts compared to 
locations with smaller foreign populations if sociological theories of party behavior are correct.  
Contrary to these expectations, neither Muslim nor USSR population variables have a 
statistically significant relationship with SPD policy creation.  Perhaps it is not the total number 
of immigrants, but rather the number of immigrants who are citizens that matters.  In line with 
political opportunity approaches, citizenship may create outlets for immigrant political 
                                                
11 See Table A1 in the appendix for multi-level logistic regressions that correspond to the basic 
logistic regressions in Table Four.   
12 Table A2 in the appendix shows the same estimations without clustered standard errors, which 
are similar to the clustered estimations because within district correlation is low 
13 This finding does not invalidate clustering on district*year because even though time does not 
correlate with SPD policy-making (the dependent variable) and the other covariates, observations 
can still be interdependent over time. 
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participation (Garbaye 2001, 2007 Koopmans) and politicians may recognize the interests of 
citizens over non-citizens who cannot reward their efforts with votes.  The lack of statistical 
significance on the Muslim citizenship coefficient shows that the relationship between 
citizenship and SPD policy proposal cannot be distinguished from zero using traditional 
standards.  In estimations not shown, these findings hold for bivariate models as well as for 
different variable coding specifications.  Regardless of how the demographic variables are coded 
or what variables are included in the estimation, coefficients are not significant.   
 
Table Four about here 
 
Graph One about here 
 
 
The next several models in Table Four continue to include demographics, but gradually 
add in party competition variables.  The different party competition variable coding represent 
party seat share.  Information from my own in-person interviews of SPD city councilors (that I 
discuss in more depth in the next chapter) corresponds to specific vote share percentages.  For 
example, SPD councilors report that the Greens are a significant source of electoral competition 
in locations where Greens have ten percent or more of seats in the city council.  Below this 
amount, SPD politicians say consistently that their party does not compete with Greens for votes.  
Ten percent Green vote share is also a natural cut point in the data as the data are bi-modally 
distributed around this point.  Two levels of Linke competition are also apparent in both 
interviews and the data.  There are districts where: 1) the Linke either has only a few or no seats 
on the council and therefore does not compete with the SPD; or 2) the Linke has passed a certain 
threshold of electoral support and challenges the SPD for city council seats.  This threshold is 
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five percent of council seat share, as SPD politicians report that Linke party members are not a 
significant source of electoral competition below this point.  The lower Linke competition cut-
point relative to Green competition may indicate a higher level of SPD electoral vulnerability to 
the Linke, affirming the significance of the remaining working class vote for the SPD.   
Far right parties sit on five of the twelve district councils during the period under 
examination.14  The number of far-right seats in these districts ranges from one to three, with an 
average seat share of two.  Districts with at least one far-right council member are coded as one, 
and those without far-right councilors take on a value of zero.  The argument here is that the 
presence, rather than the size of the far-right, affects SPD behavior.  Getting on the council 
indicates that the far-right has passed the three percent electoral threshold.  Given that 
approximately 115,000 votes were cast in each district during the 2006 municipal election, three 
percent totals to almost 3,500 votes (Berlin Wahl 2006).  
The coding of the CDU competition variable depends on CDU behavior rather than vote 
share because there are essentially two different types of CDUs – one that is actively pro-
immigrant and another that does not frequently engage in immigrant policy-making.  The idea 
here is that Christian Democrats that produce minimal integration policy (operationalized below 
the mean of seven policies) do not exert pressure on the SPD.  CDUs that make seven or more 
pro-immigrant policies push the SPD to be more active on these topics.  Another way to 
construct the CDU variable is to include anti as well as pro immigrants policies in a single 
                                                
14 Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg city councilor Edgar Glatzel left the CDU for the far-right Freedom 
Party in April 2011.  Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg is not coded as having a far-right party because 
Glatzel was not elected as a member of a far-right party and therefore does not indicate electoral 
support for the far-right. Glatzel ran in September 2011 Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg municipal 
election as part of the Freedom Party and was not re-elected to the city council.   
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measure by subtracting these values.  Choosing between these alternatives is inconsequential 
because the same districts are above and below the mean in both coding’s.       
The rest of the estimations in Table Four test the relationship between party competition 
and SPD pro-immigrant policy proposal.  Models Two, Three, Four, and Five individually add 
competition variables to the estimation.  The only variable that is significant across these models 
is the Linke competition measure in model three.  The negative coefficient on this measure 
indicates that Linke electoral threat decreases the likelihood of SPD pro-immigrant policy 
proposal relative to minimal Linke competition (p < .01).  This finding should be interpreted 
cautiously because we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all coefficients equal (at or less than 
p < .05) .   
Model Six contains all of the competition and demographic variables and provides 
evidence for the party competition approach.15  The direction and significance of the relationship 
between Linke competition and SPD policy proposal remains, but here we can reject that all the 
coefficients are zero (p < .001), controlling for demographics and other sources of electoral 
competition.  Green competition is also significant in Model Six, but unlike Linke electoral 
pressure, increases the probability of SPD pro-immigrant policy-making.  These findings 
indicate that party competition from parties on the left drives SPD’s behavior, while competition 
from center and far-right parties does not exert the same effect.16  The final model in Table Four 
                                                
15 Table A3 in the appendix includes a full model with the addition of a control for the number of 
policies per district.  Including this variable does not greatly alter the size or direction of 
coefficients.  I do not include this measure in other estimations because a comparison of the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) between the models with and without policies per district 
indicates a difference of 4.683, which provides “positive support” for the model without this 
measure.  
16 In models not shown, I estimated Model Six with several different measures of far-right 
competition, including total far-right vote share (that includes parties that did not meet the 3% 
 42 
adds an indicator for SPD seat share to evaluate if having the most council seats relative to other 
parties decreases electoral pressure, therefore diminishing incentives for the SDP to make (or not 
make) integration policy.  This does not appear to be the case as the coefficient on SPD seat 
share is not significant and the Green and Linke competition variables’ relationship with SPD 
policy behavior remains robust.  
 
Odds Ratios 
           Odds ratios, which are the ratio of the probability that an incident occurs to the probability 
that is does not take place, are often used to interpret the relationship between independent and 
dependent variables in logistic regression.  Table Five reports odds ratios for all previous models.  
Odds ratios above one indicate a positive relationship of the independent variable on SPD policy 
proposal, while an odds ratio below zero shows a negative relationship.  Model Six demonstrate 
that Green competition on the SPD increases the odds of SPD pro-immigrant policy proposal by 
a factor of 5.488 relative to locations where the Greens do not exert electoral pressure on the 
SPD, all else being equal (p < .01).  The size and significance of this effect increases to an odds 
ratio of 7.871  (p < .001) when SPD seat share is added in Model Seven.  Linke competition 
decrease SPD policymaking by a fifth in both models (.203 and .185 odds ratios) relative the 
locations where the SPD does not compete with the Linke (p < .001).  SPD seat share remains in 
upcoming estimations because of it is theoretically relevant even though excluding it fits the data 
slightly better (BIC = 5.751) 
                                                                                                                                                       
threshold) instead of the measure dichotomous measure discussed above.  Measurement error 
appears not to be driving the estimation results because different far-right competition indicators 




Table Five about here 
 
Predicted Probabilities 
           Predicted probabilities demonstrate how Green and Linke competition independently and 
simultaneously affect the overall likelihood SPD policy production.  Unlike odds ratios, 
covariates must be placed at specific values to calculate predicted probabilities.  Graphic Two 
shows sets of predicted probabilities when independent variables take on either their highest or 
lowest values.  The same trends predominate across both groups of probabilities, yet the overall 
likelihood of pro-immigrant SPD behavior is larger when covariates are set to their highest 
levels.  The first probabilities show “base-level” SPD policy-making when neither Green nor 
Linke pressure is present.  The likelihood of pro-immigrant behavior rises to its highest level 
when the SPD encounters competition from the Greens, but not the Linke.  Then, it drops 
precipitously when the Linke instead of the Greens threaten the SPD.  When competition from 
both parties exists, their conflicting pressures counteract and produce relatively moderate levels 
of policy.          
Graph Two about here 
 
Controlling for Different Policy Content Themes   
The previous estimations show that electoral competition from different left parties have 
specific and opposite relationships with SPD integration policy proposal across all integration 
policies.  Now I examine if these relationship hold when controls for specific substantive and 
ethnic content substantive themes are added to the basic competition model.  Table Six shows the 
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total number of polices with different content themes and SPD policy proposal on these issues.  
The estimations in Table Seven (odds ratios in Table Eight) add individual dichotomous 
indicators of specific policy content themes to the full party competition model.  As a starting 
point, the basic party competition model is re-estimated in the first column of both tables.  
Looking across all of the models, it is clear that that the size and significance of the previously 
established relationships between left party competition and SPD policy-making remain robust 
when controls for discrimination, education, language, culture, economic, gender and Muslim 
and USSR ethnic content are added to the model.   
 
Table Six about here 
 
Although these content indicators are included as controls, the anti-discrimination, 
education, and gender content measures have statistically significant relationships with SPD 
policy proposal.  Like German federal and state governments, districts also produce anti-
discrimination policy.  These policies pertain to protections awarded to immigrants based on 
their ethnic or religious background and practices.  Programs protecting immigrant soccer 
players from discrimination at local sport fields and laws prohibiting anti-immigrant groups from 
meeting in government buildings are examples of district-level anti-discrimination policy.  The 
anti-discrimination measure is positive and has an odds ratio of 1.757, meaning that the SPD is 
close to twice as likely to propose anti-discrimination policies relative to other policies, all else 
being equal (p < .05).  While Länder governments preside over education policies such as 
secondary school graduation requirements and teaching religion in school, districts also deal with 
localized education issues.  In the data these policies include adding content about immigrant 
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culture to school curriculum, and hiring more language teachers for students who speak German 
as a second language.  Education issues have a negative relationship with SPD policy proposal, 
as the SPD is about half as likely (.581 odds ratio) to legislate on these topics compared to 
policies that do not concern education (p < .05).  Comparatively, a positive relationship exists 
between gender content and SPD policy-making.  The SPD is more than two and a half times 
more likely (2.549 odds ratio) to propose gender policies compared to policies without gender 
themes (p < .05).  Examples of these policies include the “Neighborhood Mothers” 
(Stadtteilmütter) program that trains immigrant women to provide public outreach to their peers, 
funding for afterschool programs for immigrant girls, and the creation health brochures for 
female immigrant prostitutes.   
Policies with ethnic content are proposals that target specific ethnic groups.  Most ethnic 
content policies in the data concern either Muslim ethnic groups (i.e.,Turks and Arabs) or 
individuals from the former Soviet Union.   Muslim ethnic policies include funding to prevent 
Berlin’s oldest Turkish arts venue (Tiyatrom) from closing, developing youth art programs with 
the German-Arab cultural club, and working with the Turkish trade association to help Turkish 
immigrants find jobs. Translating government pamphlets into Russian and helping Eastern 
European immigrants leave entry-level jobs for which they are over qualified are examples of 
ethnic policies that concern immigrant from the Soviet Union (“USSR policies”).  The 
relationship between both ethnic content measures and SPD policy proposal is not statistically 
significant by traditional standards.     
 
Tables Seven about here 
 
Tables Eight about here 
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Muslim Ethnic vs. Muslim Religious Policies  
Unlike ethnic policies, Muslim religious policies have clear religious themes and deal 
with topics such as mosque building and veiling.  It is important to differentiate between these 
policies because the SPD may use ethnic policies to appeal to Muslims, but avoid religious issues 
that risk alienating native supporters.  Only twenty five policies (less than four percent of pro-
immigrant policies) mention Islam.  Table Seven shows party proposal of Muslim religious 
policies.  These policies are discussed descriptively and not included in estimations because the 
SPD only makes four Muslim religious policies.  Comparatively, the Greens and the CDU make 
close to two thirds of these policies.  Three of the four SPD policies concern stopping 
discrimination against Muslims and the other aims to protect Muslim women from forced 
marriage.   
Table Nine about here 
 
Specific themes permeate both Green and CDU policy-making on Islam.  Green policies 
accommodate religious practices like Islamic burials and daily prayer (salah) in public school.  
Local efforts to provide school prayer rooms are noteworthy because they conflict with higher-
level Green party behavior.  The Green Party education minister in the Berlin House of 
Representatives, Özcan Mutlu, said that prayer in school, “as an integration policy (it) sends the 
wrong signal” and conflicts with Germany’s constitutional mandate for religious neutrality of the 
state (Wutke 2010).  Policy incongruence across different levels of government is not surprising 
because the Greens do not have a hierarchical, top-down organization structure.  Local 
politicians therefore have significant freedom to do what they want even if their behavior 
conflicts with Green activity elsewhere.  During interviews with local policymakers, Green 
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politicians told me that this flexibility was an integral part of their party and represented the 
Greens new flexible approach to politics.  Other Green Muslim religious policies include making 
a public declaration in support of a mosque attacked by arsons, familiarizing public health care 
providers with Muslim religious requirements, and protecting Muslims from religious 
discrimination.   
Most CDU policies endorse teaching Islam in public schools.  Unlike the Green’s stance 
on prayer rooms, this perspective mirrors CDU policy at higher levels of government.  While 
Berlin public schools offer religion courses, these classes are not mandatory and students can 
take ethics instead.  The CDU, along with Muslim organizations such as the Turkish Islamic 
Religious Union (DITIB), came together to support the referendum.  The SPD placed itself 
firmly in the camp against the referendum, which was only supported by fourteen percent of 
Berlin’s registered voters and did not pass.  
 
Party Competition & Policy Themes 
How does electoral competition condition the relationship between policy content and 
SPD pro-immigrant policy proposal?  Are some policy topics more susceptible to party 
competition than others?  To answer these questions, I estimate models with interactions between 
party competition variables and policy content indicators in Table Ten.  These regressions differ 
from those in Table Seven, which simply control for different policy types, because they 
demonstrate how party competition and content themes function together to alter SPD behavior.  
As a baseline, the first model in Table Ten does not include content indicators or content*party 
competition interactions.   
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Table Ten about here 
 
The previously established relationships between party competition and SPD pro-
immigrant proposal persist across all of the interactive estimations as Green competition has a 
positive effect, and Linke competition has a negative effect on SPD policy-making.  The size, 
direction, and significance of these coefficients mirror previous models.  Due to the fact that that 
the Green and Linke variables are composite terms in the interactions, their coefficients represent 
the effect of competition from these parties when the policy domain is not education (language, 
culture, etc).  To calculate the effect of electoral competition when the policy domain is 
education (language, culture, etc), the coefficient on the relevant composite term must be added 
to the coefficient on the interaction on (β education + β Green competition*education).  It is 
necessary to combine these coefficients because, like linear models, interactive coefficients in 
logistic regression represent the “change” in effect rather than the “net” effect of an independent 
variable on the dependent variable.  I do not discuss these effects because none of the 
interactions between Green/Linke competition and different policy content themes are 
statistically significant.  
While these interactions are not significant, the interactions between CDU competition 
and all policy content themes except anti-discrimination are statistically significant (p < .05 to P 
< .001).  Once again, the CDU indicator measures whether the CDU is pro-immigrant (CDU = 1) 
or anti-immigrant (CDU = 0).  The hypotheses laid out in chapter one posit that the center-left 
parties will increase their integration policy-making when they encounter a pro-immigrant 
center-right party to retain minority supporters who may shift their support to the center-right.  
The estimations in Table Ten provide support for this hypothesis for many content themes as the 
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SPD increases its behavior on cultural, economic, and gender integration policy issues when it 
competes with a pro-immigrant CDU.   
To show how center-right competition changes SPD behavior across different policy 
themes, I calculate the effect of these policy issues at different pro-immigrant CDU values (0 
versus 1).  Odds ratios are reported individually because these values are conditional on the 
values of the composite terms in the interaction.  Beginning with Model Three in Table Ten, the 
effect of education policy content when the SPD faces an anti-immigrant CDU is -.028 on the 
logit scale (log odds), which when exponentiated yields an odds ratio of .972. 17   This means that 
when CDU is anti-immigrant (CDU = 0), the odds of SPD proposing pro-immigrant policies 
only decreases by 2.8% (.972 odds ratio) for education policies compared to non-education 
policies holding other covariates constant.  Comparatively, when the SPD encounters a pro-
immigrant CDU, the odds of the SPD proposing pro-immigrant education policy decreases by 
86.7% (.133 odds ratio). This indicates that, contrary to the expectation of my hypothesis, the 
likelihood of SPD making education policies decreases when the SPD faces a pro-immigrant 
CDU.  Why should the odds of SPD education policy-making decrease when a pro-immigrant 
CDU is present?  While future research should explore this question in more depth, I briefly 
offer a possible explanation.  Perhaps the SPD decreases its activity on education policy when 
faced with a pro-immigrant CDU because under these circumstances the CDU controls this 
policy domain.  The SPD may subsequently decide to focus its attention elsewhere because it 
cannot compete with the CDU on these topics.  While the CDU only makes about 30% of all 
education policies and therefore does not dominate culture policy everywhere, it is possible that 
in it has “captured” cultural issues in some locations.   
                                                
17 See Appendix for odds ratio calculations for interactive models.  
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Tables Eleven about here 
 
 
Table Eleven shows odds ratios and statistical significance for the full effects of 
education as well as culture and economic content themes at different CDU competition values.  
I do not include odds ratios for language and gender because of the low number of policies in 
these content areas, which gets smaller when broken into different SPD proposal and CDU 
competition sub-categories (See Tables A4 and A5 in the appendix).  Unlike education, CDU 
competition increases the likelihood the SPD will make cultural and economic policies.  When 
facing an anti-immigrant CDU, the likelihood of SPD cultural policy proposal are reduced by 
86.2% (.138 odds ratio), compared to a decrease of only 36.6%  (.634 odds ratio) when the SPD 
encounters a pro-immigrant CDU.  While the relationship between SPD policy-making and 
cultural content is negative with or without the CDU, the presence of a pro-immigrant CDU 
greatly decreases the strength of this negative relationship.  Finally, the relationship between 
economic policy content and SPD policy proposal actually shifts from negative to positive when 
the SPD faces a pro versus anti-immigrant CDU.  When facing an anti-immigrant CDU the 
probability of SPD economic policy proposal decreases by about 72% (.281 odds ratio).  But, the 
likelihood of SPD proposal increase by about 174% (2.735 odds ratio) on economic policies 
(relative to policies without economic content) when the CDU is pro-immigrant.18   
 
Tables Twelve about here 
 
                                                
18 It is not uncommon for likelihoods from odds ratios to exceed one hundred percent. For an in-
depth look at interpreting odds rations in Logistic Regression, See Long & Freese’s “Regression 
Models for Categorical Vairables (2006) pages 177-80.   
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To conclude this section, I discuss whether similar trends remain for the relationship 
between party competition and ethnic policy content (coefficients in Table Twelve).  An 
important finding from the interactive ethnic policy models is that the relationship between 
Muslim ethnic policy content and SPD policy proposal is negative when the SPD faces an 
electoral challenge from the Linke and positive when they do not encounter this type of 
competition (Model Three).  When facing Linke competition, the probability of SPD Muslim 
ethnic content proposal decrease by 68% (.320 odds ratio), but increases by more than 350% 
when Linke competition is not present (4.518 odds ratio).  This corroborates earlier finings that 
Linke electoral threat has a negative relationship with SPD pro-immigrant policy-making.  
Indeed, Linke competition transforms the SPD from an agenda setter to an inactive observer on 
Muslim ethnic policies.   
Tables Thirteen about here 
 
 
Alliances, Berlin House of Representatives, & Muslim SPD Politicians 
This section evaluates three remaining alternative hypothesis on the source of variance in 
SDP pro-immigrant policy-making.  The first pertains to alliances (Zählgemeinschaft) that are 
formed within district governments.  Like coalitions in the Bundestag, alliances unite parties to 
elect a government leader, who is the mayor at the district level.  But, unlike coalitions, local 
alliances are non-binding and district governments do not dissolve when alliances fall apart.  
While parties make policy independently, alliance partners may influence each others’ policies.  
We would therefore expect the SPD to make more integration policies when aligned with the 
Greens and fewer policies in an alliance with the Linke.  The first two columns of Table Thirteen 
(odds ratios in Table Fourteen) show estimations for models that include measures of SPD/Green 
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and SPD/Linke alliances.19   When the SPD/Green alliance indicator is included in the model, the 
relationship between Green/Linke competition and SPD policy proposal remains the same, but 
the significance of the coefficient on both competition measures decreases slightly.  There does 
not appear to be a relationship between alliance membership and SPD policy proposal because 
the SPD/Green alliance coefficient is not significant at normal standards.  When included in the 
model, the SPD/Linke measure is also not significant and does not alter the size or the direction 
of the relationship between Green and Linke competition and SPD policy-making.   
The Berlin House of Representatives, which is the level of government above the 
districts, may also shape SPD behavior on immigrant integration.  Local councils have 
significant power over policy even though the Berlin House sets broad concepts and goals.  
While the Berlin State Constitution (Verfassung von Berlin) mandates that city governments 
implement Berlin House policies, district vary in terms of how they deal with these issues.  Also, 
it is at a party’s discretion whether it will be the party to take up the Berlin House’s agenda.  We 
would expect that local SPD councilors would implement these policies because the SPD was 
part of the coalition government that controlled the Berlin House during the period under 
examination.20  While few district councilors run in Bundestag elections, they frequently 
compete for seats in the Berlin House.  Since many candidates are elected through closed party 
lists, there are incentives for local politicians to represent the agendas of colleagues in the Berlin 
House if they want to run in future Berlin House of Representatives elections.  In short, 
politicians who toe the party line are more likely to be promoted than party members who 
                                                
19 The SPD seat majority is not included because of its high correlation with the SPD/Green 
alliance measure.   
20 Elections for the Berlin House of Representatives and District Councils occur on the same day 
and members of both bodies serve the same terms.   
 53 
disregard party directives.  Contrary to these expectations, policies that implement mandates set 
by the Berlin House do not have a discernable relationship on SPD policy-making. 
Finally, do SPD politicians with a foreign background affect SPD integrations policy?   
Perhaps parties with councilors who are immigrants or the descendants of immigrants will make 
more integration policies than parties without politicians with a foreign background.  The idea 
here is that immigrant politicians represent their communities in government and may also 
influence non-immigrant politicians to legislate on integration.  Sur names are used to distinguish 
politicians with a foreign background.  Given that many Germans who are not recent immigrants 
have Polish, Russian, and other Eastern European surnames, politicians with Turkish and Arabic 
names can only be counted.  Surprisingly, only eleven out of Berlin’s 660 district councilors 
have a Muslim background.  The SPD, Greens, and Linke each have three Muslim politicians and 
the CDU has two.  The three Muslim politicians are spread across different districts.  The 
coefficient on Muslim politician in the last estimation in Table fourteen indicates that SPD with 
Muslim councilors are not more likely to make integration policy.21   
 
Tables Fourteen about here 
 
Tables Fifteen about here 
 
Conclusion 
 The empirical evaluations in this chapter provide support for many of my hypotheses.  I 
posit in Chapter One that electoral competition affects center-left party behavior on immigrant 
integration policies and that strategic electoral concerns outweigh demographic and institutional 
                                                
21 The SPD seat majority is not included because of its high correlation with the SPD immigrant politician measure.   
 54 
factors.  According to my theory, electoral threat from different parties will alter center-left 
policy-making in particular ways.  Multiple statistical models indicate that contestation from 
other left parties has a unmistakable and strongly significant relationship with center-left policy 
making in Berlin and that different left parties have distinct effects on center-left policy 
production.  Electoral competition from Green parties increases the probability that center-left 
politicians will make integration policy, while competition from far-left former communist 
parties decreases this same likelihood.  How much do these rivalries affect center-left policy-
making?  In places where the center-left Germany Social Democratic Party (SPD) competes with 
the Green party for votes, the SPD is close to eight times more likely to make integration policy 
compared to locations where Greens do not exert an electoral threat (p < .001).  Comparatively, 
in districts where the SPD competes with the far-left Linke party, they are about a quarter as 
likely to make integration policy relative to places where the Linke is less powerful (p < .001).  
These findings remain robust even after controls for unemployment, minority population size, 
and other forms of party competition are added to the model.  They also endure across different 
policy content themes such as discrimination, language, and gender.  Competition from parties 
on the right has a more complex relationship with center-left integration policy production.   SPD 
politicians are more likely to make policies on immigrant issues such as education, culture, and 
jobs when they encounter a pro-immigrant a CDU.  Yet, competition from far-right parties does 
not alter SPD policy-making on immigrants, even though these parties compete for native blue-








Using District Case Studies to Examine SPD Integration Policy-making 
 
This chapter uses qualitative data to examine the mechanisms underlying center-left 
political party behavior on policies for immigrants and minorities.  Analyses from earlier 
sections establish a statistically significant relationship between center-left policy-making on 
these issues and electoral competition from other left political parties.  They also demonstrate 
that different forms of competition influence SPD policy-making in particular ways:  Green 
electoral competition increases the probability that the German SPD will make immigrant and 
minority policies, while competition from the far-left Linke party decreases this likelihood.  
Using qualitative data to evaluate the mechanisms that undergird these relationships clarifies 
how and why electoral competition affects SPD behavior, and demonstrates that this evidence is 
consistent with the theoretical arguments and quantitative findings in earlier chapters.   
To explicate these mechanisms, I analyze SPD policymaking in the Berlin districts of 
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte.  I select these cases for theoretical and methodological 
reasons, which I discuss in more depth below.  I utilize the statutory text of policies obtained 
from district council meeting minutes, as well as other local, state, and federal government 
records and newspaper articles for this analysis.  I also use my own in-person interviews of fifty 
Berlin city councilors to establish that SPD politicians: 1) perceive different forms of electoral 
competition; 2) value specific groups of voters depending on the type of competition they 




I begin this chapter by discussing case-selection and providing relevant background 
information on Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte.  I then compare SPD policy-making and the 
different types of electoral competition the SPD encounters in these locations.  Next, I evaluate 
alternative hypotheses and demonstrate that the qualitative evidence attenuates these approaches.  
I also examine specific examples of SPD policy-making across various policy domains, 
including anti-far right, youth, and employment to show that SPD behavior differs on similar 
issues in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte.  Finally, I evaluate evidence that clarifies and 
supports the electoral competition mechanism that I discuss in earlier chapters.   
 
Case Selection 
As noted above, methodological and theoretical factors motivate my case selection.   
First, Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte maximize variance on the dependent variable because 
SPD politicians are active on immigrant and minority policy issues in the former, but are 
relatively disengaged in the later.  Second, and most fundamental for the argument I advance 
here, these districts are prime examples of either Green (Friedrichshain-Kreuzber) or Linke 
(Mitte) electoral threat on the SPD.  Yet, these districts share many crucial characteristics that 
allow me to hold several potential explanatory factors constant.  They also have some of the 
highest total number policies, giving me leverage to compare policy-making across various 
policy domains within each location.  The decision to compare two rather than a greater number 
of districts also serves an analytical purpose.  My aim is to conduct a deeper instead of a wider 
and more peripheral evaluation of SPD behavior.  Given that earlier quantitative analyses yield 
aggregate assessments of the districts, my objective here is to explicate the mechanism that 
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motivate SPD behavior by probing the rich content of the policy data in Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg and Mitte.   
 
Interviews 
My interviews with Berlin district councilors provide important evidence throughout this 
chapter.  I conducted these semi-structured interviews in Berlin during the summer of 2010 and 
2011, during which time I spoke with fifty district councilors from Berlin’s twelve districts.  
Each interview followed similar guidelines:  I asked respondents a set of questions in the same 
order to ensure consistency across interviews.  Given time and financial constraints, conducting 
fifty interviews allowed me to talk to at least three SPD councilors per district.  I interviewed 
five SPD and four Green city councilors in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, and five SPD, two Green, 
and two Linke city councilors in Mitte.  
Interviews lasted on average for 1.5 hours and occurred either at a café, the respondent’s 
place of work, or his/her government office.  All interviews were conducted in German (unless 
the respondent preferred to speak English) and a research assistant who was a native German 
speaker was present if translation was necessary.  Politicians were selected randomly for 
interviews from online lists of local SPD councilors and were contacted by email and phone.  
The only councilors who were not randomly selected were three SPD politicians with an Islamic 
background.  I decided to interview these councilors because they could offer important 
information about the SPD and integration, but were unlikely to be included in my sample.  Most 
people I contacted for interviews were very responsive and only eleven potential respondents 
could not be reached or did not want to participate.  There is no evidence to suggest that their 
abstention was systematic or that their lack of participation biases the sample.     
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During my fieldwork, I kept informal records of the “types” of councilors I interviewed 
to evaluate my sample’s diversity and representativeness.  These records indicate that I 
interviewed approximately equal numbers of men and women (which is not surprising given that 
the SPD creates closed party lists with about the same number of men and women for district-
level elections).  Politicians with different ages, office tenures, and from East Germany were also 
represented in my sample and mirror the overall population of SPD councilors in Berlin.  
Overall, I spoke with mothers with small children (who came to the interview), individuals in 
office since the fall of the Berlin Wall, people in their first term, those employed in white-collar 
and blue-collar jobs, and even another PhD student who was getting a doctorate in engineering.  
 
Dependent Variable: SPD Policy Behavior 
SPD behavior on immigrant and minority policies differs greatly between Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg and Mitte.  In Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, the SPD produces about 40% of district 
council’s 107 integration policies between 2007 and 2011.  Comparatively, Mitte’s SPD only 
makes about 20% of the 89 total integration policies during this time period.  This is below the 
33% policymaking mean and 29% median for SPD integration policy-making across all districts.  
While the Greens outpace the SPD on these issues in both locations, the policy-making gap 
between the two parties is only five percentage points in Friedrichshain-Kreuzbgerg and thirty 
percentage points in Mitte.     
Although these comparisons indicate that the SPD plays a greater role in immigrant and 
minority policy-making in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg than Mitte, they do not elucidate what 
policy-making looks like and how SPD behavior varies between these locations.  To provide a 
more nuanced and complete assessment of SPD behavior, I evaluate and compare specific 
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policies below.  To preface what is to come, I find that Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg’s SPD is active 
on anti-far-right and youth policies, as well as policies that concern Turkish immigrants.  
Comparatively, Mitte’s SPD is not active on these issues.  The only SPD policy-making that 
overlaps between the districts concerns employment programs for migrant workers.  While 
Mitte’s SPD is an agenda setter on integration policy, the Greens are very engaged in these 
topics and their behavior closely resembles SPD policy-making in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg.      
 
Main Explanatory Variable: Left Electoral Competition 
As discussed in earlier chapters, I operationalize electoral competition as a dichotomous 
variable.  My interviews indicate that Berlin SPD city councilors perceive electoral competition 
as binary, rather than as graded or continuous.  In response to questions about whether particular 
parties competed with the SPD for votes in the last (2006) or previous elections, or if these 
parties would be competitors in the next election (2011), councilors consistently told me that that 
compete for votes with one main party.  While electoral competition may vary within districts, 
SPD city councilors identified one party as the most significant source of electoral competition in 
the district as a whole.  For example, SPD councilors in Pankow reported that while they 
compete with the Linke in the northern part of the district and the Greens in the South, their main 
competitor overall was the Linke.   
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte are similar districts with different forms of left 
competition on the SPD.  The Greens arguably pose the strongest challenge to the SPD in 
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg relative to all other districts.  Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg  is the only 
Berlin district where the Greens have a plurality of council seats (36%).  It is also the only Berlin 
municipality with a Green mayor and the first electoral district in Germany to have a directly 
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elected (versus elected from a party list) Green representative to the Bundestag (Hans-Christian 
Ströbele, in 2002). When I asked SPD city councilors in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg what party (or 
parties) they compete with, the answer was always the Greens.   Although Mitte does not have 
the largest Linke seat share among Berlin districts, their power has been consistently growing in 
the district and I select Mitte because it allows me to hold important demographics and 
institutional variables constant.  According to my interviews with SPD district councilors in 
Mitte, “8 or 12 years ago, the SPD’s main competition came from the CDU.  Now it is the Linke” 
(interview June 2011).  Other councilors echoed this point, indicating that the Linke was their 
primary electoral rival.   
My discussions with SPD councilors across Berlin also revealed that electoral 
competition is increasing for the SPD.  The following statements indicate that SPD councilors 
perceive a changing electoral landscape.   
 It is harder for the SPD to win elections because there are now smaller parties 
that threaten older parties, especially at the local level  (SPD city councilor in 
Mitte, May 2011). 
 
The SPD has changed a lot over the last decades.  It used to be easier to get 
elected as an SPD in Berlin.  Now it is not as easy to get elected (SPD city 
councilor in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, May 2011).     
 
Elections are more difficult for the SPD at all levels of government.  In the past, 
the SPD had a strong proletariat ideology and strong ties to workers.  But now 
there are fewer workers. So, the (political) target group has changed considerably. 
(SPD city councilor in Tempelhof-Schöneberg, June 2010). 
   
There are more and more parties and voters are more flexible in Germany.  
Germany used to have just a few parties, now there is more competition (SPD city 
councilor in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, June 2011).   
 
In the past, you joined a party and you remained there.  But now, people change 
parties frequently (SPD city councilor in Pankow, June 2011).   
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Politics are so different now then they were 20 years ago. Society is so different.  
On some issues, the SPD has moved to the right.  On others, it has moved to the 
left.   
 
Winning elections at the local level is harder because there are smaller parties.  
The CDU faces a similar challenge (SPD city councilor in Neukölln, June 2011).   
 
These statements indicate that electoral competition is an important concern for the SPD, 
especially at the local level.  They also demonstrate that SPD politicians are aware of the 
growing power of smaller parties and their declining base of working class support.   
 
Alternative Hypotheses: Demographics 
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte share important similarities that allow several 
alternative explanatory factors to remain fixed and therefore unable to explain variance in SPD 
behavior.  In addition to being urban, former eastern districts that neighbor each other in Berlin’s 
inner city, Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte have some of the largest foreign and Muslim 
populations in the city.  In Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, these populations are concentrated in the 
Eastern part of Kreuzberg, while Mitte’s immigrant communities reside in the Wedding and 
Tiergarten neighborhoods.      
Approximately 36% Friedsirchshain-Kreuzberg’s 268,225 residents and 45% of Mitte’s 
332, 919 inhabitants have a foreign background, and Turks are the predominant ethnic minority 
in both municipalities (Statistik Berlin Brandenberg 2010).  Muslims in Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg and Mitte compose about 16.6% and 18.1% of the total population respectively, well 
above the 10.5% average Muslim population across districts (Statistik Berlin Brandenberg 
2010).  About 60% of Muslims in both Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte do not have German 
citizenship (Statistik Berlin Brandenberg 2010).  These demographic similarities are relevant 
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because they attenuate claims that the presence of immigrants, Muslims, or Muslim citizenship 
drives center-left behavior on policy issues that concern these communities.  Given that these 
factors do not vary, they cannot explain why the SPD behavior different between the two 
districts.   
          Another demographic-based explanation for variance in SPD policy-making concerns 
minority populations’ socioeconomic status (SES) rather than their ethnic or religious 
background (Givens & Leudtke 2000, Saggar 2000).  Following the logic of this approach, 
immigrants and minorities with higher SES are economically integrated into German society and 
therefore may not require the same SPD policy response as similar groups who lack the same 
financial stability.  If this is argument correct, we should observe more SPD action on minority 
issues in places where these populations have lower SES, and relatively less policy-making 
where minorities have a higher standard of living.  The fact that foreign and native populations in 
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte have some of the lowest SES in the city, yet SPD behavior 
still varies, weakens this explanation.  The unemployment rate in Fridrichshian-Kreuzberg and 
Mitte is 17.1% and 18.3% respectively, above Berlin’s 14.5% average (Statistik Berlin 
Brandenberg 2010).  Average income is also the lowest in these two districts, at approximately 
1,200 Euros per month (Berlin Property Portal 2010).  Berlin’s Urban Development Department 
(Senatsverwaltung für Stadtenwicklung und Umwelt) classifies Friedrishain-Kreuzberg and 
Mitte as having the lowest social and economic development scores based on the department’s 
own index that includes indicators such as youth unemployment and percent of residents 
receiving welfare benefits (Social and Urban Development Monitoring 2008, 2010, 2012). 
Although we might expect far-right parties to gain strength in these economically depressed 
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locations, far-right parties have never passed the three percent electoral threshold required to 
obtain city council seats in either district.   
  
Alternative Hypotheses: Institutional Arguments 
 Another approach for explaining variance in SPD behavior between Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg and Mitte concerns political institutions.  As noted in previous chapters, all Berlin 
districts function under the same electoral and political rules.  Yet, alliance structures and SPD 
seat share differ across municipalities.  The main purpose of alliances (Zählgemeinschaft) is to 
form coalitions large enough (28 votes, or one more than 50% of the 55-person council) to elect 
a mayor.  After the mayor is chosen, alliances are non-binding and frequently dissolve.  Earlier 
empirical sections evaluate the argument that the SPD politicians are more likely to make 
immigrant integration policies when they are in an alliance with the Greens and less likely to 
produce these policies when they are aligned with the Linke.  Although these analyses do not 
show a statistically significant relationship between either alliance partnership and SPD policy 
behavior, I nonetheless examine qualitative evidence that reinforces this finding.  
Unlike population and economic indicators that are common to both Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg and Mitte, different parties form their governing alliances.  The Greens and the Linke 
are in an alliance in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, while the SPD, Greens, and the center-right Free 
Democratic Party (FDP) govern Mitte.  The composition of these partnerships and subsequent 
SPD policy-making cast doubt on the claim that alliances alter SPD behavior.  In fact, we would 
expect opposite SPD behavior than what we observe given the parties in these alliances.  Even 
though the SPD is in a coalition with the Greens in Mitte, they are not active on immigrant 
issues, indicating that that an alliance with the Greens is not causing the SPD to engage in more 
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integration policy-making.  Comparatively, the SPD is not included in Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg’s governing alliance, yet produces a relatively large amount of these policies.  This 
suggests that being part of the Zählgemeinschaft (with or without the Greens) is not a necessary 
pre-condition for SPD integration policy-making.   
SPD Muslim politicians may also influence their party’s integration policy-making.  The 
logic here is that Muslim politicians may be more likely to produce integration policies because 
they are members of the community affected by these issues.  Alternatively, the presence of 
Muslim SPD politicians may alter the behavior of non-Muslim SPD council members, who may 
gain an awareness and interest in integration issues from their Muslim colleagues.  If Muslim 
politicians affect SPD policy-making in these ways, then we should observe the reverse of what 
we actually see in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte.  Of these two districts, only Mitte has a 
Muslim SPD politician.  SPD politicians in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg are more active on Muslim 
and minority policy issues even though they lack a single Muslim party member.  Although this 
project does not systematically examine minority politician political behavior, it is relevant to 
note that Mitte’s Muslim SPD councilor  only proposes two (out of 18) SPD integration policies 
during the entire five-year period under examination.   
SPD seat share is another institutional variable that may affect SPD policy behavior.  As 
discussed earlier, having the most council seats relative to other parties may decrease electoral 
pressure, therefore abating incentives for the SPD to produce (or not produce) integration 
policies.  The SPD’s seat share in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte is 27% and 35% 
respectively.  The SPD in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg have the second highest number of seats, 
after the Greens’s 36%.  Mitte’s SPD outnumbers all other parties’ council seats.  Even though 
the SPD has the most seats in Mitte, their 35% seat share (19 council seats) arguably is not 
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enough to insolate them from electoral competition or give them enough power to pass policies 
without other parties’ support (which requires 28 votes, or nine more than the SPD has in the 
Mitte’s council).   
 
SPD Policy Behavior 
In this section, I evaluate SPD behavior across various policy-domains to elucidate how 
and why SPD policy-making varies between Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte.  I highlight 
these policy-domains, which include anti-far right, youth, and unemployment, because they 
demonstrate important similarities and differences between SPD behavior in these two locations.  
Although this project focuses on variance in SPD behavior, I also discuss Green Party policy-
making in Mitte because it parallels SPD activities in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg.  These 
similarities confirm an important aspect of the mechanism I propose in earlier sections – namely, 
that analogous policy concerns permeate the districts.  Yet, different parties assume policy-
making responsibility for these issues.  This reinforces the notion that parties choose to legislate 
on integration policy issues.  I argue that electoral competition is a fundamental factor in this 
choice, which I discuss in more depth shortly.  
 
Anti-far-right Policies 
Far-right extremism and violence is increasing in Germany and across Europe.  A 2011 
report by Germany’s federal police notes a marked increase in the amount of politically 
motivated crimes by far-right perpetrators (Steinenger 2011).  These individual are part of a new 
generation of young (under 30), internet-savvy far-right supporters who embrace nationalist and 
anti-immigrant sentiments.  Deeply suspicious of the EU and their own governments, their 
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platforms focus on cultural identity and their disdain for Islam’s growing influence in Europe.  A 
recent report by the British research institute Demos highlights the rising prevalence of anti-
immigrant sentiments, especially suspicion of Muslims, among far-right supporters.  While anti-
Semitism was a unifying force for far-right parties in the 1910s, 20s and 30s, “Islamophobia” is 
the uniting viewpoint today (Walker and Taylor 2011).   
Berlin is no exception to this trend, as Far-right violence increased from 51 average 
incidents per year between 2000 and 2005, to118 annual crimes from 2006 to 2010 (Radke 
2011).  Both Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mite consistently have more far-right violence than 
other districts (Schmid 2007).  Yet, the SPD is only active on thee issues in Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg.  Consider the policy entitled “Not an Inch for Fascists in Kreuzberg or Anywhere” 
(#DS/2260/III) that the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg SPD created in May 2011.  Besides expressing 
public support for the victims of recent right wing violence, this motion aims to use district 
resources to review local police action during the incident.  This policy is a direct response to a 
recent Neo-Nazi march in Berlin that turned violent when far-right activists began attacking 
“people of with dark skin” ("Menschen dunkler Hautfarbe") and peaceful protesters (content 
from city council meeting minutes May 2011).  The language of the policy is strong and direct:    
The District Government of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg is in solidarity with the 
victims of this extreme right-wing violence…the perpetrators must be punished 
with the utmost severity of the law…the District Government will continue to fight 
Neo-Nazi violence and other manifestations of right-wing violence in our district 
and everywhere!  We call on all residents to work against right-wing violence and 
continue to support civic initiatives in this arena.  Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg 
remains a district that has a diverse population of incomparable character.  The 
tolerance ends where the intolerance begins (BVV Meeting Records May 2011) ! 
 
Although we cannot observe how Mitte’s SPD would have responded to this exact situation in 
their district, a far-right protest similarly turned violent in the district in August 2011.  In 
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response to this violence, the Greens instead of the SPD draft a policy called “No Nazis in Mitte” 
(Keine Nazis in Mitte).  Similar to the policy in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, it “condemns the 
gathering of neo-Nazi members in (the districts)” and notes that the city council will “use all 
legal and political opportunities to prevent right-wing activities.”  Although the Greens may 
simply have made this policy faster than other parties, city council meeting minutes from Mitte 
do not indicate that the SPD had plans to legislate on this issue and were simply outpaced by the 
Greens.  This is reinforced by the fact that the SPD does not produce any anti-far-right policies 
during the entire five-year period under examination.  The similarities between the 
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg SPD and Mitte’s Greens on anti-far right policy-making are not 
limited to these policies.  Both parties draft laws prohibiting Neo-Nazi groups from renting 
public spaces in the district (DS/0987/III in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and 1220 /III in Mitte) and 
preventing the sale of Neo-Nazi clothing and paraphernalia (DS/1628/III in Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg and 0052/III in Mitte).  
 
Local Implementation of State Level Policies  
         The anti-far-right polices I have examined this far are examples of local level policy-
making.  The Berlin House of Representatives (Abgeordnetenhaus) also drafts anti-far-right 
legislation.  While the Berlin State Constitution (Verfassung von Berlin) obligates the district 
governments to implement Abgeordnetenhaus policies, it does not indicate which party or 
council member(s) should take on this role.  Consequently, we observe different parties 
implementing the same state-level policies across districts.  The Berlin program, “Youth for 
Diversity, Tolerance, and Democracy” (hereafter YDTD), which is the largest state-level anti-far 
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right program launched during the time period under examination, demonstrates this variance in 
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte. 
          YDTD is a nineteen million Euro program that the Abgeordnetenhaus launched in 2007 in 
response to growing right-wing extremism in Germany.  In 2006, there were 11,000 right-wing 
offenses in Germany.  Seven hundred or about 6.5% of these were violent crimes, representing a 
five-year high (Radke 2011).  The text of YDTD indicates that the central aim of the program is 
to raise awareness and prevent far-right activities through education and youth-focused activities.  
YDTD provides the district governments with funding (up to 100,000 Euros per year) to create 
and implement local programs that meet these objectives.  Examples of local level YDTC 
implementation include diversity programs for parents in Pankow and workshops for native and 
immigrant teens in Treptow-Köpenick.    
 The SPD in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and the Green in Mitte create YDTC programs.  
The SPD in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg draft several different YDTC policies (DS/039/III, 
DS/2180/III, DS/0199/III, DS/0110/III), which include an exhibition on historic and current Nazi 
activities in Germany and programs for teens at risk of joining right-wing extremist groups.  City 
council records show that different members of the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg SPD draft these 
policies, indicating that support for YDTC is party-wide, rather than the prerogative of one 
individual. The SPD in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg also draft policy DS/1632/III, which mandates 
continued funding for local YDTC programs using the district’s own financial resources after 
state funds are exhausted.   
          Green behavior in Mitte on YDTC resembles SPD activity in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg.  
The programs Green party politicians create similarly work with youth at risk for far-right 
behavior (0114/III) and educate immigrant children on xenophobia within their own 
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communities (0094/III).  This behavior indicates that the Greens are instrumental in directing 
YDTC funds to the district.  Comparatively, there is no evidence in Mitte’s city council records 
that the SPD plays a role in developing YDTC programs.  
 
Youth Policy 
          SPD behavior on policies for children and adolescence also varies between Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg and Mitte.  On average, Muslim populations in Europe are younger than their non-
Muslim counterparts.  In 2010, individuals under thirty comprised approximately 49% of 
Europe’s Muslim population, compared to only 34% of non-Muslims in the region (Pew 2011). 
In Germany, the share of the Muslim population under twenty-four exceeds non-Muslim of the 
same age by about twelve percent (Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009).  In response to these 
demographics shifts, both Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte produce a large number of 
policies that target immigrant youth.  The SPD in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg draft motion 
DS/0843/III that aims to increase “inter-cultural sensitivity” in district pre-schools, which are 
publicly funded in Germany.  They also create an outreach programs for immigrant parents to 
bring their children to pre-school for language training (DS/0845/III) and propose a program 
called “Fit and Fair Integration and Social Skills”  (DS/0319/III) to promote inter-cultural 
understanding at the Naunynstrasse Children’s Center in Mitte.   
          Similarly, the Mitte Greens make policies encouraging immigrant parents to enroll their 
children to pre-school (0865/III) and training teachers to work with immigrant and minority 
children (0122/III).  They also draft policy 0848/III that creates an environmental education 
program called “Green at School” (Grün macht Schule) for immigrant children and their families 
that aims to “help immigrants understand environmental and conservation issues.”  Green at 
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School is noteworthy because it translates environmental policy into an immigrant integration 
issue.  This policy serves a joint-purpose for the Greens because it helps them protect the 
environment and build political relationships with immigrant families.  Once again, we do not 
observe any SPD behavior on youth policy issues in Mitte.   
 
Local Unemployment Policy   
          To this point, the policy evidence indicates that SPD behavior on far-right, state-level, and 
youth policies varies in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte.  Unemployment is a unique policy 
domain because SPD behavior in both locations is similar.  This topic may be easier for the SPD 
because it naturally aligns with their historical and ideological background as a workers party.  A 
prime example of SPD unemployment policy for immigrants in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg is 
DS/0391/III that creates a new job-training program with language and vocational education for 
immigrants.  Other SPD policies in the district set aside public funds to hire translators at the 
local job center (DS/1712/III) and give job-center staff intercultural training to work with 
immigrants (DS/2128/III).     
          SPD politicians in Mitte create job training programs for immigrants (0728/III), work with 
the German-Turkish Trade Association to help immigrants find employment (2138/II), and 
implement a campaign to expand local immigrant owned companies (118/III).  Even though SPD 
politicians are active on these issues, the Greens also engage in similar policy behavior in Mitte.  
The Greens create job-training programs for immigrants (0085/III) and policies to support local 
immigrant-owned businesses (1632/III).  The overlap between SPD and Green party behavior in 
Mitte demonstrates that different parties can share ownership of the same policy domain and 
made analogous policies.  This is an important point because it suggests that Mitte’s SPD could 
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have participated in far-right and youth policy-making even though the Greens were already 
involved with these topics.     
 
Turkish and Muslim Policies 
          What does SPD behavior on policies specifically for Turkish and Muslim immigrants look 
like in the two districts?  Once again, the SPD is active on these policies in Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg, but is disengaged in Mitte.  The Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg SPD draft a policy asking 
for the public German-Turkish school in the district, Aziz-Nesin, to receive building 
improvements (DS/0516/III).  Aziz Nesin is one of eight Berlin public schools that offer bilingual 
education in Turkish and German (Hottmann 2008).22 They also create an education program 
about Turkish and Kurdish history for local public schools (DS/0557/III).  Lastly, the SPD makes 
a motion allowing a Chechen refugee to remain in Germany as an asylum seeker rather than be 
deported (DS/116/III).  Although the refugee is not Turkish, as a Chechen he is part of a majority 
Muslim ethnic group.   
          Like other policy domains, Mitte’s SPD does not participate Turkish or Muslim policy-
making  and Green behavior parallels SPD activity Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg.  Examples of 
Green policy behavior include a request that the council improve Turkish language curriculum 
(0863/III) in local schools.  They also ask the council to designate public swimming pools hours 
for women to allow Muslim women and girls to follow their religious obligation to swim in 
gender-segregated pools (0845/III).  Lastly, the Greens create a policy for the council to work 
                                                
22 The other schools are Komsu Kindergarten, Mosaik Kindergarten, Rixdorfer Primary School, 
Franz Schubert Primary School, Heinrich Heine Secondary School, and Robert Koch Secondary 
School, and Carl-von-Osssietsky Secondary School.   
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with local Muslims to celebrate religious diversity through cultural events and religious festivals 
in Mitte (0852/III).   
          Although the SPD in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg are active on policies that concern 
predominantly Muslim ethnic groups, the content of these policies do not mention Islam or 
Muslims.  This behavior suggests that the SPD may be reaching out to these constituents as 
ethnic rather than religious minorities.  As I discuss in Chapter One, religion is not an easy topic 
for the SPD politicians because of their secular ideological tradition and support for the 
separation of church and state.  The Greens in Mitte (and in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg) appear to 
be more amenable to policy issues that directly concern Islam and Muslims as they make most of 
these policies.23  
 
A Closer Look at Mitte’s SPD 
          Comparisons between Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte show that Mitte’s SPD are less 
active on integration policy issues.  Yet, the SPD does make a few integration policies and the 
content of these policies reveals how the SPD engages particular immigrant communities.  SPD 
politicians in Mitte make policies that support immigrants from Africa.24  They create an 
educational campaign about German colonialism in Africa (2110/III), stating that Germans must 
“honor” African immigrants in the district and recognize their home countries’ struggle for 
independence (City Council Records May 2011).  They also create a policy assisting African 
migrants who are the victims of gentrification and are having problems paying higher rents 
                                                
23 Besides the Greens, the CDU makes several policies that support teaching Islam in schools in 
both districts.   
24 The majority of African immigrants in Germany are Christians from Sub-Saharan Africa.   
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(1437/III, City Council Record June 2009).  These policies stand in sharp contrast to the SPD’s 
lack of engagement on policies for Turkish and Middle Eastern immigrants in Mitte. 
          In addition to African migrants, the Mitte’s SPD make a policy focused on Eastern 
European immigrants.  Policy 0166/III creates a local campaign to fight forced prostitution and 
the trafficking of women from Eastern Europe.  Forced prostitution of foreign nationals is 
significant concern in Germany.  In 2006, Germany was the most frequent destination country 
for human trafficking (UN Center for International Crime Prevention) and majority of victims 
are women from Eastern Europe and Russia (US Department of State 2008).   Forced prostitution 
is an issue throughout Berlin, in districts such as Mitte, Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, Tempelhof-
Schöneberg, and Neukölln (Reimann & Preuss 2007).  SPD politicians’ interest in this issue 
indicates that they are not completely absent from policy-making that concerns immigrants, but 
their activities pertain to specific migrant groups.    
           I learned during my interviews that some SPD politicians think that it is harder for 
Turkish and Arabic migrants to integrate into Germany, compared to immigrant from Africa, 
Asia, and Eastern Europe.  
Africans are more interested in integrating.  There was a woman from Togo in a 
poor part of the district.  She created a lunch program in Neukölln.  She sold 
lunches to people to make money.  I think Turks should do this (June 2011).   
 
Turkish and Arabic immigrants are not integrated politically or socially.  I expect 
people who move to a new country to integrate and not make parallel 
communities.  I think we need more strict integration policies in Germany (July 
2011).   
 
Turkish and Arabic immigrants are less willing to integrate into Germany.  Polish, 
Russian, and Vietnamese are more active in integration and make use of the 
resources the government provides (May 2010).  
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Polish and Russian immigrants pose no problem.  They learn German quickly and 
create no problems.  They don’t create problems because they want to integrate 
(May 2010).   
 
Many Turks come (to Germany) to use the social system and not integrate, and 
they say they don’t like Germany (July 2011).   
 
The NPD gains supporters because people notice that some Turks don’t want to 
integrate (June 2010).   
 
Some city councilors also thought that Islam hinders integration.   
It is harder for Muslims to integrate.  I’m not sure if it is related to religion.  
Religion is related to cultural background, which can make it harder.  For 
example, Polish immigrants are from Europe.  If you are not from Europe, it is 
different and harder to integrate (May 2010).   
 
Islam hinders integration (June 2011). 
 
Turkish people are not interested in getting citizenship. But people from Asia and 
Eastern Europe are interested in getting a German passport.  (This is) because of 
religion.  People from Asia and the East are more interested in peace and freedom.  
Turkish people are more interested in tradition (July 2011) 
 
Competition for Different Constituencies 
 At the root of the electoral competition mechanism that motivates or dissuades agenda-
setting on immigration is the SPD’s desire to capture the support of particular constituencies. 
Electoral competition from the Greens increases the electoral relevance of progressive and 
minority constituents, while competition from the Linke increases the significance of native, 
working-class supporters.  As noted earlier, it is not the mere existence of these groups that 
matters.  Rather, it is the threat of losing these constituencies that increases their electoral 
relevance.  Given that competition for these voters is an essential aspect of my argument, this 
section provides evidence that center-left policy-makers perceive this threat and value different 
groups of voters depending on the type of party competition they encounter.  If my framework is 
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correct, then we should observe the SPD soliciting and recognizing the value of progressive and 
minority voters in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and native, working class supporters in Mitte.  
 How can we ascertain which groups of voters SPD politicians value?  Perhaps campaign 
spending records could provide evidence that SPD politicians target different constituencies 
during elections.  Internal memos and party meeting transcripts may also help clarify if SPD 
councilors discuss strategies for engaging various political support networks.  Unfortunately, if 
these records exist, the SPD does not make them publicly available.25  In the absence of these 
data, I use my own interviews with SPD city councilors in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Mitte 
to show that they value particular constituencies and perceive different electoral rivals.   
          Minorities and immigrants were a consistent theme during my interviews in 
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and SPD politicians appeared concerned about immigrants’ well-being 
and the SPD’s relationship with migrant communities.  An SPD councilor told me, “Muslims are 
part of the city, especially Kreuzberg.  We must give them a chance to live their lives as we live 
our lives (interview May 2011).”  Another SPD councilor similarly shared, “We have to talk to 
(Muslim immigrants) in the district and keep up the dialogue and go see them.  We have to keep 
up contact because they live here as well and we don’t want them to go back home.  The far-right 
wants them to go home” (interview June 2011).  When I asked councilors what demographic 
groups voted for the SPD in the district, they reported that immigrants and individuals from 
middle-class educated backgrounds were their primary supporters.  During my interviews, SPD 
politicians in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg also frequently mentioned the Greens.  One councilor 
stated, “twenty years ago, the Greens were focused on ecological issues.  Now Greens have more 
                                                
25 The SPD only releases aggregate campaign spending data for Federal and State elections that 
cannot be Linked to Berlin’s different localities.  No data are available for district-level elections.   
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ideas” (July 2011).  Another said, “The politics of the Greens has gotten a broader focus because 
there are more people involved and they cover more topics like education and the economy” 
(July 2011).  It was clear to me through these conversations that local SPD politicians were 
concerned about the Green’s increasing political power and the well-being of minority and 
migrant communities in the districts.   
         Even though I asked SPD councilors in Mitte the same set of questions, their responses 
varied considerably from their counterparts in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and did not focus on the 
Greens or minority/middle-class voters.  Instead, native working-class constituencies were a 
consistent theme throughout these interviews.  Responding to a question I asked about how the 
SPD has changed over the last twenty years, a SPD councilors replied, “Even though union 
power has declined, the SPD still reaches out to unions for votes.  The Linke is also fighting for 
these votes” (interview May 2011).  In another interview, an SPD politicians said, “the SPD face 
a difficulty because of the Linke, because now the Linke has significant left wing support” 
(interview June 2011).  When asked about what type of people live in the district, one councilor 
said, “the population in Mitte is very diverse, but the Germans who live in here are very 
conservative, both on the left and right” (interview May 2010).  This assessment of local 
constituencies stands in sharp contrast to the SPD’s perception in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg that 
their supporters were wither minorities or middle-class progressives.   
           My interviews in Mitte also indicate that SPD politicians not only value native working-
class supporters, but worry about losing their support.  “In the past, you joined a political party 
and then you stayed.  But now, people change a lot.  Now working class voters vote for others.”  
Another councilor said, “political parties are kind of elite and academic.  This is especially a 
problem for the SPD because workers are part of the base.  The SPD is losing its connection to 
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workers” (interview June 2010).   When I asked what SPD voters think about immigrants, an 
SPD councilor responded, “I know people who vote for the SPD with negative views of 
immigrants…they are all ages, but primarily working class” (interview June 2011).   
         Taken together, responses from my interviews yield two very different assessment of the 
SPD.  In Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, the SPD has clear allegiances to immigrants, minorities and 
middle class constituents.  They stress the importance of reaching-out to immigrants and working 
toward their integration into Germany.  They also are aware of Green policy-making activities 
and growing Green electoral dominance.  The situation is very different across the border in 
Mitte, as SPD councilors are aligned with native working class populations and are concerned 
about losing these voters to the Linke.  Here, the SPD stresses its working class history and 
acknowledges the “conservative” views of left-wing voters.  These differences suggest that SPD 
councilors value very different groups of supporters, even though politicians in both districts 
encounter similar demographic and economic contexts.   
 
Conclusion 
          This chapter uses qualitative data from government administrative records, news sources, 
and in-person interviews to examine the mechanisms that connect electoral competition and SPD 
integration policy-making.  Besides supporting earlier quantitative findings that SPD behavior 
varies in demographically and institutionally similar locations, this analysis helps to clarify how 
and why these activities differ.  The district case studies of Mitte and Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg 
indicate that there is very little overlap on the amount or type of integration policy-making by the 
SPD in these locations.  While the SPD in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg sets the agenda on 
numerous integration topics, including anti-far-right and youth policy, Mitte’s SPD is less active 
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on most integration policy issues.  Policies that concern unemployment and jobs are the only 
SPD integration policy-making that coincides between these locations.  Given the SPD’s legacy 
as a worker’s party, this behavior may persist even in locations like Mitte where the SPD is not 
active on other immigrant policy issues.  Finally, my in-person interviews with local politicians 
in these districts engender two very different images of the SPD.  The SPD in Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg is socially liberal, progressive, and prioritizes immigrants’ needs and concerns.  In 







Conclusion:  Local Politics and Integration 
 
This project examines immigrant integration policies that aim to incorporate immigrants 
and their descendants into the politics, economies, and societies of their host countries.  Western 
European center-left political parties are often disengaged from this type of policy-making even 
though they are socially liberal and have historically represented minorities and individuals with 
low socioeconomic status.  Yet, this behavior is inconsistent as politicians from the same 
political party set the agenda on integration in some locations and not in others.  Germany’s long 
standing center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) exemplifies this behavior.  The SPD 
produces policies such as job and language training programs for immigrants, and endorses 
Muslim cultural activities in some parts of Berlin.  But, the SPD leaves integration policy-
making to different parties in other areas of the city.  SPD policy-making is rather puzzling 
because it varies in locations with large immigrant populations, similar economic profiles, and 
the same political institutions.  These inconsistencies engender an important question: Why does 
the behavior of the same center-left political party differ so greatly on policies that concern 
immigrants in similar locations and during identical time periods?  
Using original data from Berlin, Germany, this project demonstrates that SPD activity on 
these policy issues correlates with electoral competition from other left political parties.   
Electoral threat from the Green Party increases the likelihood that the SPD will make integration 
policies, while electoral competition from the far-left Linke party decreases this probability.  
Contestation from the far-right does not have a statistically significant relationship with SPD 
policy-making even though parties such as the National Democratic Party (NPD) challenge the 
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SPD for native, working class votes.  These relationships remain robust even after controlling for 
district-level demographic and institutional variables such as Muslim population size, 
unemployment rates, SPD seat-share, and coalition structure.  They also hold across different 
policy content themes, including anti-discrimination, unemployment, youth, economic, language 
and gender policy.   
Immigrant integration in Western Europe is an inherently local issue because municipal 
governments preside over the majority of these policies.  Even though state and federal bodies 
may make a portion of integration legislation, most laws are drafted and implemented locally.  
This is the case in Germany, as well as in Spain, Britain, the Netherlands, and even in highly 
centralized states such as France.   
Different forms of local-level electoral competition also create incentives (or 
disincentives) for the SPD to legislate on Muslim and minority policy topics.  At the root of these 
considerations is the SPD’s desire to retain core local constituencies who may shift their support 
to competitors.  SPD politicians will be more likely to augment their integration policy-making 
when they compete with the Greens because this behavior appeals to progressive and minority 
voters.  Competition from the Linke will decrease the likelihood of SPD integration policy-
making because native working class voters may shift their support if the SPD sets the agenda on 
these issues.  Although two districts may have the same distribution of voters, SPD behavior may 
look very different depending on whether the Greens (or Linke) exert a formidable electoral 
threat.  Voters will have a credible exit option in locations where the Greens (Linke) are 
powerful, but will lack this choice in locations without a viable Green (Linke) alternative.  
Although constituents may become disillusioned and abstain from voting if the SPD does 
not make policies they desire and they lack other electoral options, the SPD can attempt to retain 
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their support by appealing to their policy preferences on other salient issues.  While the SPD 
could also make these appeals in contexts where they face a Green (Linke) electoral threat, this is 
a much easier task when voters do not have an exit option.  The logic here is rather 
straightforward:  It takes fewer political resources to retain voters when electoral competition is 
weak or non-existent.  In environments where a viable competitor does exist, the SPD must do 
more to retain supporters.  As we frequently observe, parties move funds and resources away 
from “safe” seats and target them towards highly contested elections.   
This framework relies on the assumption that progressives/minorities and native working 
class voters have opposing views on immigrant integration, and care enough about this issue to 
shift their support to other parties.  As noted earlier, research shows that on average, progressives 
and minorities support cultural egalitarianism, while working class natives oppose state-
sponsored cultural diversity and members of both groups (McDowell 2011, Koopmans & 
Statham 2010, Phalet & Swyngedouw 2002).  Recent evidence also suggests that members of 
both groups are leaving center-left parties because they disagree their stance on salient issues 
such as immigration (Ryan 2012, Bunglawala 2010). 
Even though they were the main electoral choice for left voters during the second half of 
the twentieth century, center-left parties are losing support across Western Europe and at all 
levels of government.  During the Cold War, far-left parties were simply too radical and the 
Greens did not exists until the 1970s (and did not become significant electoral competitors until 
several decades later).  Today, far-left former communist parties across the region have 
reinvented themselves and rarely espouse radical ideology or rhetoric.  The Greens have also 
expanded their platforms outside of traditional environmental issues and moved closer to the 
political center.  In Germany, the SPD rose to prominence as a “Volkspartei” or people’s party 
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with catch-all platforms and a diversity of members.  It is more difficult for the SPD to retain this 
“motely crew” of working-class natives and progressives/minorities today because their 
preferences on emerging issues such as immigration and Islam do not align and they have viable 
electoral alternatives.  
 
The Data 
This project evaluates the relationship between SPD integration policy-making and 
electoral competition using original policy data that I gathered from Berlin city council records.  
These data represent all policies made by Berlin’s district governments that concern immigrants 
and minorities between the 2007 and 2011 election cycles.  Great effort was taken to collect and 
code these data carefully, and they represent most if not all integration policies made during this 
period.  Any polices that are missing are excluded at random and do not systematically bias the 
data.   
          These data are unique because of the information they capture about immigrant integration 
and political party behavior.  Most research on immigrants in Europe examines a single policy 
domain, such as veiling or language training programs. I can compare party behavior across 
different types of policies because these data contain information on various policy content 
themes.  The data are also from local-governments, which as noted above are responsible for a 
large portion of integration policy-making in the Europe.  Given that most research focuses on 
national level policies, these data provide important insights on integration at the level of 





In Chapter One, I develop a party competition framework that generates observable 
implications about the relationship between electoral competition and SPD integration policy 
behavior.  The basic tenet of this approach is that electoral competition from different political 
parties will either increase or decrease the probability of SPD policy-making on immigrants and 
minorities.  Whether electoral competition enhances or reduces this likelihood depends on the 
party that competes with the SPD.  As discussed above, Green electoral competition is expected 
to boost and Linke competition to shrink this likelihood.   
          I also develop hypotheses for how electoral competition from right political parties relates 
to SPD behavior. Electoral competition from far-right political parties should decrease SPD 
agenda setting on immigrant policies because like the Linke, these parties compete with the SPD 
for native working-class supporters.  The relationship between competition from the center-right 
CDU and SPD integration policy-making is more nuanced because it depends on the “type” of 
CDU the SPD encounters.  In my data, CDU behavior on immigrants varies considerably:  In 
some districts it is on average pro-immigrant and in others it is clearly anti-immigrant.  The CDU 
makes more than one third of all anti-immigrant policies, coming in second after the far-right 
NPD.   
Given this variance in CDU behavior, I propose that the SPD will increase its integration 
policy-making when it encounters a pro-immigrant CDU and decrease this behavior when it 
faces an anti-immigrant CDU.  The logic here is that a pro-immigrant CDU may usurp minority 
and Muslim voters from the CDU.  The notion that some immigrants and minorities may vote for 
the center-right it is not unreasonable because members of these groups, especially devout 
Muslims, are socially conservative and have policy preferences that overlap with the center-right.  
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Research also shows that some center-right parties are increasing their efforts to win the support 
of immigrants and minorities in Western Europe (Bale 2009).   
 
Empirical Tests  
Chapter Two shows that various estimations with different model specifications indicate 
a robust and statistically significant relationship between Green and Linke competition and SPD 
policy production on topics that concern immigrants and Muslims.  Green competition 
consistently has a positive relationship with SPD integration policy-making, while Linke 
competition correlates negatively with this behavior.  Both findings are highly statistically 
significant by traditional standards (and in most models have p-values < .001).  In the fullest 
model with all demographic and institutional controls (model 7 in table 5), Green competition 
increases the odds of SPD integration policy-making by a factor of 7.871 (P < .001), holding all 
other variables constant.  Linke competition decreases the odds of SPD integration policy-
making about a fifth (odds ration of .185, p < .001), ceteris paribus.   
Models with demographic controls, such as Muslim population size, Muslim citizenship 
rates, and unemployment rates indicate that these variables do not have a statistically significant 
relationship with SPD policy behavior.  Additionally, including these demographics variables in 
the estimation neither alters the size nor direction of the relationship between Green and Linke 
competition and SPD integration policy-making.  The same is true for institutional variables that 
measure whether the SPD has the most council seats, is part of the governing alliance, or has city 
councilors with a Muslim religious or cultural background  (Table 14).  Finally, including 
controls for different policy content themes such as anti-discrimination, language, youth, culture, 
 85 
unemployment, gender, as well as policies that concern Muslim and former USSR ethnic groups, 
does not alter the size of direction of these effects (Table 7 and Table 12).   
These estimations provide support for my electoral competition hypotheses (specifically 
those that pertain to electoral threat from left political parties), and weaken alternative hypothesis 
that concern demographics and institutions.  Contrary to the expectation of demographically-
focused arguments, the SPD is not more likely to make integration policy in locations with larger 
Muslim and migrant populations compared to places where these communities are smaller.  SPD 
politicians in districts with higher percentages of Muslim citizens, who could reward these 
politicians for integration policy-making with their votes, are not more likely to create immigrant 
policies than councilors in locations with lower Muslim citizenship rates.  Even though the SPD 
traditionally is a workers party with ties to those with lower SES, the SPD is not more active on 
immigrant or minority topics in districts with higher unemployment rates.  When it comes to 
institutional variation that may alter SPD behavior, winning the most city council seats does not 
appear to insolate SPD politicians from left electoral threat or alter their integration policy-
making.  Having Muslim councilors or being coalition partners with either the Greens or the 
Linke also does not appear to have a relationship with SPD integration policy behavior.  
These empirical tests indicate that the type of electoral competition that correlates with 
SPD policy-making comes from parties on the left rather than on the right.  No model 
specification shows a statistically significant relationship between electoral competition from far-
right parties and SPD integration policy-making.  Although far-right parties such as the NPD 
compete with the SPD for native, working class votes, this rivalry does not appear to be strong 
enough to alter SPD behavior on immigrant policy issues.  Similarly, while a subset of the 
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center-right CDU may be appealing to Muslims and minorities, these activities do not seem to 
affect SPD behavior on most topics that concern these populations.    
 Chapter three demonstrates that qualitative evidence from case studies of two Berlin 
districts support these findings.  This section also clarifies how and why party policy-making 
differs when SPD politicians encounter particular forms of party competition.  While the SPD in 
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg sets the agenda on immigrant integration, Mitte’s SPD less active on 
these issues.  My in-person interviews with local politicians in these districts indicate that that 
SPD councilors value different groups of supporters (progressives and minorities in 
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and working-class natives in Mitte), even though they face similar 
demographic and economic contexts.   
 
Theoretical Implications 
These findings have important implications for research on political parties, especially 
theories of niche party development.  “Niche” parties, such as Greens and far-right parties that 
prioritize issues outside of traditional socioeconomic appeals are gaining power across Western 
Europe.  Recent research that aims to explain variance in niche party growth emphasizes how 
mainstream party strategy shapes these parties’ power (Meguid 2005, Art 2007).  These theories 
posit that mainstream parties on the center-left and right influence niche party success by 
engaging a platform on the niche party’s issue dimension.  Engagement can be either 
accommodative or adversarial, but this attention gives niche parties and the issues they advocate 
legitimacy and power.    
Acknowledging the dynamic and iterative relationship between mainstream and niche 
parties, my framework picks up where these theories leave off.  Mainstream parties not only 
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affect smaller niche parties, but niche parties influence the strategies of long-standing 
traditionally dominant parties.  My approach emphasizes niche party agency and ability to affect 
main-stream party behavior, particularly those on the center-left.  Given that niche parties are 
gaining supporters and seats in government across Europe, it is important to consider how their 
strength affects historically powerful catch-all parties.  As my analysis shows, these long-
standing parties are vulnerable to competition from much smaller parties.  Smaller niche parties 
do not need a plurality of seats or even to outnumber councilors from mainstream parties to 
affect mainstream party strategy.  For instance, Green party competition correlates with SPD 
behavior on immigration even in locations where the SPD controls the most council seats and 
appears relatively stable.   
This project also advances our understanding of the relationship between center-left 
political parties and immigrants in Western Europe.  I argue that the integration literature 
misclassifies this relationship because it does not acknowledge variance in center-left party 
behavior on issues that affect these communities.  Most research assumes that these parties will 
advocate on immigrants behalf and support integration issues.  But, as I show here, this is not 
always the case.   
Recognizing and understanding variance in center-left behavior on immigration is 
important because it reveals discontent and weakness within these parties.  Although we know 
empirically that these parties have been losing electoral and political power over time, examining 
internal party division on integration helps to explain why and how they are struggling.  
Although center-left decline is obviously due to a more than party conflict over immigrants, this 
policy domain is highly salient and has increasing political and electoral significance.   
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Gaining a better understanding of the factors that contribute to center-left integration 
policy-making is also important because other parties often lack the power and the will to lead 
large-scale integration efforts.  Consequently, these issues are likely to remain unresolved if the 
center-left continues to equivocate.  Failing to deal adequately with integration will undoubtedly 
increase the number of immigrants and minorities who exists on the economic, political, and 
cultural periphery of European society, which may threaten the regions growth and stability.     
 
Berlin & Takeaways for Other European Center-left Parties 
Berlin is an important case for understanding immigrant integration policy because it is a 
city with one of the largest immigrant and Muslim populations in Europe.  Given that center-left 
parties across Europe face similar issues as Germany’s SPD – namely a declining working class 
base, competition from new political parties, and party division on issues that concern 
immigrants and minorities – this project’s finding likely are applicable in other contexts.  Future 
research on center-left integration policy-making should examine how electoral competition 
affects center-left party behavior on these issues in different European cities and across time.  As 
far-right parties gain power and grow, it may be the case that competition from these parties 
exerts more influence on center-left policy behavior.  Even though electoral rivalries may change 
and adapt, the dynamics of party competition will continue to be significant factors for center-
left policy behavior on immigrant integration.   
Finally, what can other European center-left parties learn from Berlin’s SPD?  This case 
demonstrates that not only are immigrant integration issue politically salient, but they greatly 
affect center-left political rivalries.  How center-left parties like the British Labor Party, the 
French Socialists (PS), the Dutch Labor Party (PvdA), the Social Democratic Party of Austria 
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(SPO), the Belgian Socialists (PS & SPA) deal with these issue therefore will likely shape their 
power, influence, and ability to succeed against growing political competitors.  While electoral 
success and political longevity concern more than immigrant policy issues, these topics have 
increased significance because they overlap with other highly salient policy areas such as the 
economy and crime, and cross-cut traditional left-right socio-economic political cleavages.  
Consequently, immigrant integration is a significant and complex policy domain that center-left 
parties must take seriously.  Continuing to hedge and avoid these issues will only further disable 
these already weakened parties.  Besides these political ramifications, failing to deal adequately 
with immigrant integration will likely exacerbate divisions between immigrants and natives, 
strengthen perceptions of discrimination among minorities, and increase political unrest related 
to these issues.  These outcomes are not only likely to alter Europe’s political landscape, but will 





Tables, Figures, & Graphs 
 
Figure One: Map of Berlin Districts 
 
 
Source: Wikipedia Commons: “Map of administrative divisions of Berlin” 
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Table One: Party Pro-immigrant Policy Making Across Districts 
 
District Total Pro-immigrant Policies SPD Green Linke CDU FDP 
Charlottenburg-
Wilmersdorf 45 20.0% 42.2% 13.3% 20.0% 4.4% 
Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg 107 39.5% 44.5% 16.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Lichtenberg 31 29.0% 38.7% 12.9% 19.4% 0.0% 
Marzahn-
Hellersdorf 53 41.5% 22.6% 32.1% 3.8% 0.0% 
Mitte 89 20.2% 50.6% 12.4% 14.6% 3.4% 
Neukolln 92 27.2% 25.0% 20.7% 27.2% 0.0% 
Pankow 42 26.2% 19.0% 47.6% 7.1% 0.0% 
Reinickendorf 44 27.3% 47.7% NA26 25.0% 0.0% 
Spandau 31 29.0% 19.4% 19.4% 32.3% 0.0% 
Steglitz-
Zehlendorf 26 42.3% 26.9% 0.0% 26.9% 3.8% 
Tempelhof-
Schöneberg 40 55.0% 25.0% 7.5% 12.5% 0.0% 
Treptow-
Köpenick 28 39.3% 25.0% 25.0% 10.7% 0.0% 
TOTAL 628      
Mean 52.33      
 
  
                                                




      Table Two: Party Proposal of Integration Policies 
 
Party Pro policies Anti Policies Neutral 
SPD 190 7 6 
Green 225 5 10 
Linke 113 2 10 
CDU 94 37 14 
FDP 6 0 0 
NPD 0 60 5 






Table Three: Variable Names, Values, and Means 
 
Variable Name Variable Values Mean 
SPD policy making party 1 = SPD proposed policy, 0 = other party proposed policy 0.298 
Muslim population  Percent of total district population that is Muslim.  Range: .06% - 18.41% 10.46% 
Muslim population with citizenship Percent of Muslim population with German citizenship. Range: 37.23% - 68.40%  46.16% 
USSR population 
Percent of total district population that is from (or has 
relatives from) the former Soviet Union.  Range: 
1.54% - 6.01% 
2.77% 
Unemployment Percent of unemployed district population. Range: 8.16% - 18.70% 14.52% 
East 1 = district is in former East Berlin, 0 =district is in former West Berlin 0.557 
Green competition 1 = high Green competition on SPD, 0 = low Green competition on SPD 0.635 
Linke competition 1 = high Linke competition, 0 = low Linke competition 0.775 
Far-right competition 1 = far-right party on district council, 0 = no far-right party on district council 0.392 
Pro-immigrant CDU 1 = CDU is pro-immigrant, 0 = CDU is not pro-immigrant 0.678 
SPD seat majority 1 = SPD has most seats in council, 0 = SPD does not have most seats in council 0.588 
Discrimination  1 = policy content concerns discrimination, 0 = policy content does not concern discrimination 0.229 
Education 1 = policy concerns immigrant education, 0 = policy does not concern immigrant education 0.220 
Language 1 = policy concerns language, 0 = policy does not concern language 0.084 
Culture 1 = policy concerns culture, 0 = policy does not concern culture 0.115 
Economic 
1 = policy concerns immigrant jobs or economic 
programs, 0 = policy does not concern immigrant jobs 
or economic program 
0.086 
Gender 1 = policy concern immigrant gender issues, 0 = policy does not include immigrant gender issues 0.054 
Muslim Religious 1 = policies concerns Islam, 0 = policy does not concern Islam 0.040  
Muslim ethnic group 1 = policy concerns Muslim ethnic group, 0 = policy does not concern Muslim ethnic group 0.068 
USSR ethnic group 1 = policy concerns USSR ethnic groups, 0 = policy does not concern USSR ethnic group 0.03 
SPD/Green Alliance 1 = SPD is in an alliance with the Greens, 0 = SPD is not in an alliance with the Greens .584 
SPD/Linke Alliance 1 = SPD is in an alliance with the Linke, 0 = SPD is not in an alliance with the Linke .756 
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Berlin House of Representatives 
1= Policy was a mandate made by the Berlin House of 
Representatives, 0 = Policy was not a mandate from 
the Berlin House of Representatives 
.187 
SPD Muslim Politician 
1= district has an SPD politician with an Islamic 
religious or cultural background, 0 = district does not 
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Table Four: Logistic regression on SPD policy making party as the dependent variable 
        Variable  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 













































































 *** (.247) 
Far-right competition       .288 (.408)   .076 (.458) 
-.040  
(.476) 
pro-immigrant CDU         -.048 (.252) -.361 (.243) 
-.550  
(.323) 
SPD seat majority             .260  (.327) 
        













log pseudolikelihood -380.015 -378.761 -376.228 -379.658 -379.991  -371.097 -370.751 
prob > chi2 0.618 0.395 0.071 0.545 0.710 0.000 0.000 
pseudo R2 0.006 0.01 0.015 0.007 0.006 0.300 0.310 




standard errors adjusted for 60 clusters on district*year in parenthesis 











Table Five: Odds ratios for logistic regression on SPD policy making party 
 as the dependent variable 
        
Variable Model 1 
Model 




5 Model 6 Model 7 
Muslim population  0.982 0.889 1.074 0.987 0.980 0.895 0.856 
Muslim population with 
citizenship 1.002 0.996 0.994 1.000 1.002 0.980 0.977 
USSR population 1.022 0.916 1.067 1.059 1.022 0.858 0.824 
Unemployment 0.973 1.062 0.936 0.950 0.976 1.140 1.119 
East 0.922 0.741 3.144 0.689 0.889 3.310 3.556  
Green competition   2.095       5.488 ** 7.871 *** 





Far-right competition       1.334   1.079 0.961 
pro-immigrant CDU         0.953 0.697 0.577 
SPD seat majority             1.296 
























Green	  =0	  Linke	  =	  0	   Green	  =	  1	  Linke	  =	  0	   Green	  =	  0	  Linke	  =	  1	   Green	  =	  1	  Linke	  =	  1	  
Predicted	  Probability	  of	  SPD	  Pro-­‐Immigrant	  Policy	  Proposal:	  
























Green	  =0	  Linke	  =	  0	   Green	  =	  1	  Linke	  =	  0	   Green	  =	  0	  Linke	  =	  1	   Green	  =	  1	  Linke	  =	  1	  
Predicted	  Probability	  of	  SPD	  Pro-­‐Immingrant	  Policy	  Proposal:	  










Table Six: Party Proposal of Policies with Different Content 
 
 













Discrimination 144 39.6% 25.0% 24.3% 11.1% 
Education 138 21.7% 30.4% 18.8% 29.0% 
Language 53 20.8% 32.1% 22.6% 24.5% 
Culture 72 27.8% 33.3% 22.2% 16.7% 
Economic 54 27.8% 44.4% 16.7% 11.1% 
Gender 34 47.1% 20.6% 14.7% 17.6% 
Muslim Ethnic 43 41.9% 41.9% 7.0% 9.3% 
Muslim Religious 25 16.0% 32.0% 20.0% 32.0% 






























Table Seven: Logistic regression on SPD policy making party as the dependent variable 
including policy content indicators 








(0.105)    
 -0.150 
(0.104)    
 -0.154 
(0.104)    
 '-0.156 
(0.104)    
-0.181 
(0.107)    
-0.154 
(0.107)    
-0.156 







(0.026)   
0.022 
(0.024)    
 '-0.024 
(0.025)    
-0.023 
(0.025)    
-0.023 
(0.025)    
-0.028 
(0.024)    
-0.021 
(0.025)    
-0.022 
(0.025)    




(0.177)    
-0.186 




(0.176)    
-0.228 
(0.179)    
-0.196 
(0.182)    
-0.197 
(0.176)    




(0.112)    
0.177 
(0.113)    
0.180 
(0.113)    
0.181 
(0.113)    
0.203 
(0.114)    
0.178 
(0.116)    
0.184 
(0.113)    




(0.734)    
1.316 
(0.715)    
1.285 
(0.702)    
1.270 
(0.703)    
1.195 
(0.721)   
1.218 
(0.713)    
1.281 




























































(.488)    
0.054 
(0.501)    
0.032 
(0.472)    
0.037 
(0.477)    
-0.040 
(0.476)    
-.009 
(0.489)    
0.017 
(0.495)    
0.044 








(0.311)    
 -0.5381 




(0.323)    
-0.586 
(0.322)    
-0.549 
(0.328)    
-0.560 
(0.322)    




(0.309)    
0.259 
(0.321)      
0.260 
(0.327)    
0.266 
(0.316)    
0.229 
(0.326)    
0.260 
(0.326)    
discrimination    0.564 * (.255)                
education     -0.542 * (0.253)               
language       -0.514 (0.365)              
culture         -0.150 (0.270)         
economic           0.020 (0.274)          
gender             0.936 * (0.378)      
 102 
Muslim ethnic 
group               
0.632 
(0.354)      
USSR ethnic 
group                 
0.348 
(0.582)    








(1.567)    
-0.399 
(1.562)    
-0.225  
(1.594)    
-0.446 
(1.582)    
-0.473 















prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
pseudo R2 0.310 0.401 0.381 0.336 0.314 0.311 0.398 0.352 0.314 
N =  628 628 628 628 628 628 628 628 628 
standard errors adjusted for 60 clusters on district*year in parenthesis 








Table Eight: Odds ratios for logistic regression on SPD policy making party as the dependent 
variable including policy content indicators 
 

















Muslim population  0.856 0.857 0.867 0.861 0.857 0.856 0.835 0.858 0.856 
Muslim population with 
citizenship 0.977 0.979 0.978 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.973 0.979 0.978 
USSR population 0.824 0.838 0.844 0.83 0.825 0.824 0.796 0.822 0.821 
Unemployment 1.119 1.203 1.190 1.193 1.197 1.199 1.224 1.195 1.202 
East 3.556 3.58 3.502 3.737 3.613 3.560 3.303 3.38 3.6 


































Far-right competition 0.961 0.939 1.055 0.969 0.964 0.961 0.991 1.017 0.957 
pro-immigrant CDU 0.577 0.587 0.575 0.584 0.577 0.577 0.557 0.577 0.571 
SPD seat majority 1.296 1.384 1.302 1.296 1.293 1.3 1.304 1.258 1.298 
discrimination    1.757 .             
education     0.581             
language       0.598           
culture         0.86         
economic           1.02       
gender             2.550     
Muslim ethnic group               1.882   
USSR ethnic group                 1.417 





Table Nine: Party Proposal of 
Muslim Religious Policies 







Table Ten: Logistic regression on SPD policy making party as the dependent variable  
including policy content * party competition interactions 






(0.977)    
-0.188 
(0.814)    
 -0.271 
(0.792)    
-0.130 
(0.846)    
-0.251 
(0.872)    
0.265 







(0.468)    
-0.179 
(0.495)    
-0.282 
(0.487)    
-0.274 
(0.468)    
-0.150 
(0.477)    
-0.170 






(0.240)    
0.054 
(0.269)    
0.108 
(0.242)    
0.117 
(0.238)    
0.088 
(0.247)    
0.116 
(0.237)    
Unemployment .181  (.113) 
0.108 
(0.420)    
0.093 
(0.434)    
0.048 
(0.449)    
0.010 
(0.434)    
0.127 
(0.426)    
0.110 
(0.418)    
East 1.269 (.699) 
1.793 
(1.053)    
1.396 
(0.884)    
1.506 
(0.857)    
1.648 
(0.911)    
1.501 








































(0.372)    
 0.311 
(0.404)    
0.105 
(0.339)    
 0.230 
(0.444)    
0.153 
(0.417)    
0.306 






(0.637)    
-0.295 
(0.695)    
-0.670 
(0.477)    
 -0.948 
(0.508)    
-0.997 
(0.553)    
-0.697 






(0.695)    
0.278 
(0.737)    
0.623 
(0.568)    
0.747 
(0.604)    
0.821 
(0.637)    
0.564 
(0.632)    
discrimination   1.199 (1.093)             
youth     -0.091 (0.600)            
language       -0.894 (1.242)          
culture         -1.982 ** (0.761)     
economic           -1.271 (0.904)      
gender             1.413 (1.260)    
discrimination * 
Green comp   
0.041 
(0.423)              
discrimination * 
Left comp   
0.017 
(0.401)              
discrimination * 
far right comp   
-1.145 * 
(0.497)            
discrimination * 
CDU comp   
0.221 
(0.783)              
discrimination * 
SPD seat   
-0.562 
(0.641)              
youth *  
Green comp     
-0.530 
(0.520)            
youth *  
Left comp     
0.538 
(0.833)            
 105 
youth *  
far right comp     
-0.075  
(0.563)            
youth *  
CDU comp     
-1.752 
(0.978)            
youth *  
SPD seat      
1.193 
(0.835)            
language * 
Green comp       
1.907 
(1.350)          
language *  
Left comp       
-1.102 
(1.080)          
language *  
far right comp       
1.037  
(1.094)          
language *  




      
language *  




      
culture * 
Green comp         
0.928 
(0.740)        
culture *  
Left comp         
1.025 
(0.799)        
culture *  
far-right comp         
-0.175 
(0.719)        
culture *  
CDU comp         
1.602 * 
(0.773)     
culture *  
SPD seat         
-0.962 
(0.716)        
Economic * 
Green comp           
0.617 
(0.878)      
economic *  
Left comp           
0.027 
(1.154)      
economic *  
far right comp           
0.490 
(0.756)      
economic * 
CDU comp           
2.277 * 
(1.036)     
economic *  
SPD seat           
-1.638 
(1.052)      
gender *  
Green comp             
-0.645  
(1.237)    
gender *  
Left comp             
0.731 
(1.324)    
gender *  
far right comp             
-1.316 
(1.197)    
gender *  
CDU comp             
13.880 *** 
(1.968) 
gender *  




constant -0.398 (1.563) 
-1.176 
(1.185)    
-0.544 
(1.033)    
 -0.449 
(0.973)    
-0.386 
(0.985)    
-0.497 
(1.030)    
 -1.127 
(0.967)    
 106 
log 
pseudolikelihood -370.751 -363.396 -363.846 -367.770 -368.104 -369.053 -366.142 
prob > chi2 0.000 0.000      0.000      0.000     0.000     0.000      0.000 
pseudo R2 0.310 0.506 0.491 0.380 0.382 0.352 0.427 
N =  628 628 628 628 628 628 628 
standard errors adjusted for 60 clusters on district*year in parenthesis 
 legend: * p <.05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
Table Eleven: Odds ratios for policy content themes at 
different CDU competition values 
 
Anti-immigrant 
CDU (CDU = 0) 
Pro-immigrant CDU 
(CDU = 1) 
Education  0.972 0.133* 
Culture 0.138 ** 0.634 * 





Table Twelve: Logistic regression on SPD policy making party as the dependent variable  
including ethnic policy content * party competition interactions 
 










(0.841)    
‘-0.134  






 ‘-0.168  
(0.478)    
 ‘-0.233  
(0.485)    
‘-0.148  
(0.474)    
‘-0.259  






(0.240)    
0.108  
(0.234)    
0.084  
(0.251)    
0.093 
 (0.269)    
Unemployment .181  (.113) 
0.105  
(0.423)    
0.069  
(0.435)    
0.137  
(0.435)    
0.078 
 (0.435)    
East 1.269  (.699) 
1.538  
(0.896)    
1.280  
(0.899)    
1.625  
(0.884)    
1.572 
 (0.919)    
Green 



























(0.390)    
0.230  
(0.402)    
0.216  
(0.374)    
0.203 






 (0.525)    
-0.722  
(0.506)    
-0.717 
 (0.511)    
-0.712  






(0.619)    
0.593  
(0.616)    
0.580 
 (0.605)    
0.574  
(0.626)    
Muslim ethnic 
group   
0.617 
 (0.344)    
1.508  
(1.256)        
USSR ethnic 
group       
0.328  
(0.601)    
-0.908  
(1.514)    
Muslim ethnic 
group * green 
comp 
    1.497  (1.253)        
Muslim ethnic 
group * left 
comp 
     -2.648* (1.120)     
Muslim ethnic 
group * far right 
comp 
    0.033  (0.970)        
Muslim ethnic 
group * SPD 
seat majority 
    -0.026  (0.809)        
USSR ethnic 
group * green 
comp 
        2.879 (1.791)    
USSR ethnic 
group * left 
comp 
        -0.893 (1.628)    
USSR ethnic 
group * far right 
comp 
        0.480 (1.093)    
USSR ethnic         -0.064 (1.880)    
 108 
group * CDU 
pro immigrant 
USSR ethnic 
group * SPD 
seat majority 
          
constant -0.398 (1.563)  -0.697 (0.996)    -0.541 (0.991)    -0.744 (0.994)    -0.533 (1.020)    
log 
pseudolikelihod -370.751 -369.626 -366.193 -371.035 -368.490 
prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
pseudo R2 0.310 0.345 0.431 0.301 0.360 
N =  628 628 628 628 628 
      
standard errors adjusted for 60 clusters on district*year in parenthesis 





Table Thirteen: Odds ratios for Muslim ethnic 




















Table Fourteen:  Logistic regression on SPD policy making party as the dependent variable 
including indicators for alliances, Berlin House of Representatives, & Muslim SPD 
Politicians 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Muslim population -0.343 (.236) -.099 (096) -.146( .102) -.061 (.131) 
Muslim population with citizenship -0.064 (.051) -.025 (.026) -.023 (.025) .017 (.024) 
USSR population -0.621 (.486) -.151 (.160) -.161 (.171) .219 (.205) 
Unemployment 0.365 (.240) .107 (.101) .168 (.110) .174 (.117) 
East 2.336 (1.202) .990 (.670) 1.149 (.697) 1.536 (.833) 











(.247) -1.433** (.473)  
Far-right competition -.893 (1.028) .598 (.565) .037 (.466) -.020 (.480) 
pro-immigrant CDU -1.264 (.861) -.419 (.342) -.576 (.319) -.541 (.387) 
SPD seat majority   .170 (.325) .234 (.321)   
SPD/Green Alliance 1.616 (1.518)       
SPD/Linke Alliance   -.538(.399)     
Berlin House of Representatives     .242 (.275)   
SPD Muslim Politician       -.934 (1.649) 
constant 2.825 (3.402) .179 (1.533) -.382 (1.539) -.979 (1.835) 
log pseudo likelihood -370.371 -369.871 -368.776 -370.939 
prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
pseudo R2 0.321 0.333 0.324 0.301 
N =  628 628 628 628 
     
standard errors adjusted for 60 clusters on district*year in parenthesis 






















Table Fifteen: Odds ratios for logistic regression on SPD policy making party as the 
dependent variable including indicators for alliances, Berlin House of Representatives, & 
Muslim SPD Politicians 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Muslim population 0.709 0.905 0.864 0.94 
Muslim population with citizenship 0.937 0.976 0.977 0.982 
USSR population 0.537 0.86 0.852 0.803 
Unemployment 1.441 1.113 1.184 1.191 
East 10.336 2.692 3.156 4.645 
Green competition 18.243** 5.328*** 7.456*** 6.24*** 
Linke competition  0.041* 0.202*** 0.184*** 0.238** 
Far-right competition 0.410 1.818 1.038 0.980 
pro-immigrant CDU 0.282 0.658 0.562 0.582 
SPD seat majority   1.186 1.263   
SPD/Green Alliance 5.035       
SPD/Linke Alliance   0.584     
Berlin House of Representatives     1.273   
SPD Muslim Politician       0.393 
 
standard errors adjusted for 60 clusters on district*year in parenthesis 





Table A1: Multi-level Logistic regression on SPD policy making party as the dependent variable 
                




5 Model 6 Model 7 








(.070) -.111 (.093) -.155 (.106) 











(.098) -.020 (.023) -.023 (.024) 








(.135) .154 (.149) -.193 (.155) 








(.073) .131 (.100) .181 (.117) 








(.479) 1.197 (.846) 1.269 (.846) 










Far-right competition       .279 (.478)   .076 (.393) -.040 (.415) 
pro-immigrant CDU         -.023 (.304) -.361 (.239) -.550 (.331) 
SPD seat majority             -.260 (.313) 
                













log pseudolikelihood -379.169 -378.390 -376.669 -379.004 -379.166 -370.371 -370.751 
prob > chi2 0.777 0.585 0.15 0.811 0.867 0.008 0.012 
Number of Groups 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 






































Table A2: Logistic regression on SPD policy making party as the dependent variable without 
clustered standard errors 
        
Variable  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 

































































(.721) 1.269 (.699) 










Far-right competition       .288 (.408)   .076 (.458) 
-.040  
(.476) 
pro-immigrant CDU         -.048 (.252) -.361 (.243) 
-.550  
(.323) 
SPD seat majority             .260  (.327) 
        













log pseudolikelihood -380.015 -378.761 -376.228 -379.658 -379.991  -371.097 -370.751 
prob > chi2 0.618 0.395 0.071 0.545 0.710 0.000 0.000 
pseudo R2 0.006 0.01 0.015 0.007 0.006 0.030 0.031 
        
 




Table A3: Logistic regression on SPD policy making party as the  
dependent variable with policies per district 
      
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 
Muslim population  -.155 (.106) - .356 (.207) 
Muslim population with citizenship -.023 (.024) -.022 (.032) 
USSR population -.193 (.155) -.167 (.162) 
Unemployment .181 (.117) .225 (.128) 
East 1.269 (.846) 1.849 * (.864) 
Green competition 2.063 ** (.739) 2.618 ** (.826) 
Linke competition -1.688 ***(.439) -2.528 ***(.698) 
Far-right competition -.040 (.415) -.331 (564) 
pro-immigrant CDU -.550 (.331) -.452 (.765) 
SPD seat majority -.260 (.313) -.661 (.519) 
Policies per district   .048 (.036) 
constant -.398 (1.744) -.401 (1.701) 
log pseudolikelihood -370.751 -369.871 
prob > chi2 0.310 0.328 
BIC 817.053             812.370 
N =  628 628 
standard errors adjusted for 60 clusters on district*year in parenthesis 






Table A4:  SPD Language Policy Proposal at different CDU 
Competition Values  




10 32 42 
Proposed by 
SPD 3 8 11 
   53 
Table A5:  SPD Gender Policy Proposal at different CDU  
Competition Values 




3 15 18 
Proposed by 
SPD 4 12 16 




Odds ratio calculations for interactive models:  
 
Odds Ratio of Education content when CDU = 1:  
β education + β CDU*education = -.028+-1.922 = -2.020 
 e^-2.020 = .133.   
 
Odds Ration of Education content when CDU = 0 
e^-.028 = .972 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Odds Ratio of Cultural content when CDU = 1:  
β economic + β CDU*economic = -1.982 + 1.602 = -.380 
 e^-.380 = .634  
 
Odds Ratio of Cultural content when CDU = 0 
e^-1.982 = .138 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Odds Ratio of Economic content when CDU = 1:  
β culture + β CDU*culture = -1.271+2.277 = 1.006 
 e^1.006 = 2.735.   
 
Odds Ratio of Economic content when CDU = 0 
e^-1.271 = .281 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Odds Ratio of Muslim ethnic content when Linke = 1:  
β Muslim ethnic content + β Linke*Muslim ethnic content = 1.508 + - 2.648 = -1.140 
e^-1.140 = .320 
 
Odds Ratio of Muslims ethnic content when Linke = 0 
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